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Abstract 
My dissertation studies labor market dynamics using detailed longitudinal household level 
data from multiple countries. The institutional differences among different countries make 
the cross-national comparisons particularly interesting. Chapter one examines the 
occupational mobility of workers between occupations that vary in the intensity of routine 
tasks in Britain and Germany. Chapter two studies the relationship between the worker’s 
unobservable ability and the probability of involuntary job loss in four countries. Chapter 
three considers the impacts of job displacement on workers in Britain and Germany. 
Following the hypothesis of Routine-Biased Technical Change, chapter one reports a 
declining employment share of routine occupations in both Britain and Germany. In Britain, 
the slower growth of wage premia of routine occupations encourages routine workers 
witch to other occupations. Higher ability workers are more likely to upgrade to cognitive 
occupations, while lower ability ones are more likely to downgrade to manual occupations. 
However, in Germany, wage premia of cognitive occupations increased. Therefore, most 
workers move from routine occupations to more highly compensated cognitive ones in the 
face of automation. 
Chapter two investigates involuntary job loss in four countries--Britain, Germany, Korea 
and Switzerland. In all four countries, conditional on a vector of traditional observable 
attributes, lower ability workers are consistently more likely to experience involuntary job 
loss. In addition, I find unionization at the work place plays an important role in this 
mechanism. In Britain, Korea and Switzerland the union sector contributes almost all the  
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effect while in Germany lower skilled workers in both unionized and non-unionized sectors 
are disproportionally more likely to lose jobs. 
Additionally, the impacts of job displacement in Britain and Germany are examined in 
chapter three. Losses of labor earnings are very similar four years after job loss. However, 
families in Germany seem to be able to better respond to the losses of earnings caused 
by a job displacement. The cross-national contrast is sharper when considering the 
additional role of government.  In Germany, no statistically significant differences in post-
government income are observed following job displacement while four years later, losses 
in family income remain at more than 10 percent in Britain. 
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Chapter One 
Labor Market Polarization in Britain and Germany 
A Cross-National Comparison Using Longitudinal Household Data 
Xiupeng Wang 
Abstract 
Since the 1980s, the share of employment for mid-wage occupations decreased while the 
wages for them also declined relative to the top and bottom of the distribution in many 
advanced countries. The hypothesized explanation of this employment and wage 
polarization is a phenomenon called Routine-Biased Technical Change (RBTC), where 
new machines and computers substitute for workers in mid-wage occupations that have 
a high content of routine tasks. Taking advantage of panel data for Britain and Germany, 
this study examines the occupational mobility of workers between occupations that vary 
in the intensity of routine tasks. Among workers in routine occupations, higher unobserved 
skills are positively related to switching to higher-paid, non-routine cognitive occupations, 
while those who have lower levels of unobserved skills are more likely to move to lower-
paid, non-cognitive manual occupations. This occupational mobility has resulted in faster 
future wage growth for all job switchers, relative to those who stayed in the routine 
occupations. Wage polarization is found in the British labor market similar to that observed 
in the U.S., as routine workers transit down to manual jobs and upwards to cognitive jobs. 
However, in Germany, which is characterized by very different educational and labor 
market institutions, most workers move from routine occupations to more highly 
compensated cognitive ones in the face of automation. 
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1.1 Introduction 
Research demonstrates that during the last three decades, the employment share of mid-
wage occupations decreased in many industrialized countries compared to the 
employment share in both higher- and lower-paid occupations (Autor & Dorn, 2013). At 
the same time, the wage of mid-wage occupations declined relative to higher- and lower-
paid occupations (Acemoglu & Autor, 2011). The hypothesized explanation is a 
phenomenon called Routine-Biased Technical Change (RBTC), in which new machines 
and computers substitute for workers in occupations that have a high content of routine 
tasks (Autor, Levy, & Murnane, 2003).  
Previous studies have focused mainly on the aggregate effect on employment and 
wage growth but the occupational mobility of individual workers that underlies the macro 
level phenomenon has received little attention. In the context of the general equilibrium 
theory of worker occupational sorting and mobility (Gibbons, Katz, Lemieux, et al., 2005; 
Jung & Mercenier, 2014), this paper empirically investigates individual occupational 
mobility arising from RBTC. The analysis is carried out using detailed household level 
longitudinal data from Britain (the British Household Panel Survey, or BHPS 1 ) and 
Germany (the German Socio-Economic Panel, or SOEP2). The panel data allow workers’ 
individual-by-occupation fixed effects to be estimated and used as a proxy for the workers’ 
unobserved abilities. Then, the analysis relates the distribution of unobserved ability 
among those in mid-wage routine occupations to both job mobility and wage growth.   
Institutional differences between Britain and Germany, for example in the 
orientation and organization of their educational systems and protections provided for 
                                                          
1 For more information about BHPS see: https://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/bhps. 
2 For more information about German SOEP see: https://www.diw.de/en/soep. 
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workers by differing labor market institutions, make comparison of these two countries 
especially interesting. Unlike the British system, in which general education plays an 
important role in the preparation of workers for their careers, Germany has one of the 
world’s most successful vocational education systems.  Starting at a very early stage of 
the worker’s educational path, youths are trained for employment in specific industries and 
occupations (Hoffman, 2011). This form of education is oriented towards specific skill 
development for workers who, it is argued, will be well prepared to fulfill jobs at the 
beginning of their careers because they have received more instruction related to the 
particular job where they are likely to work (Shavit & Müller, 2000).  Nonetheless, since 
these workers have a high proportion of human capital that is specific to particular 
industries, occupations, and employers, this is thought by some to act potentially as a 
barrier, limiting the future occupational mobility of the German worker (Scherer, 2004) to 
only certain other jobs and industries due to a lack of general skills. The British educational 
system, in contrast to Germany, does not provide training aimed at a smooth and well-
regulated transition into early careers (Scherer, 2001).  Thus, this analysis of employment 
and wage polarization across countries provides a useful contrast between outcomes for 
countries that have different approaches to education at the primary and secondary levels.  
Another important difference between Britain and Germany is the extent of 
unionization and the employment protection it provides (Autor, Kerr, & Kugler, 2007; Boeri 
& Jimeno, 2005).  As a typical Anglo-American country, Britain is relatively more liberal in 
allowing market forces to operate in the labor market than Germany, which has stronger 
statutory protections for workers (Freeman, 2007). The right to form unions is part of the 
German Constitution. Accordingly, while trade union density in Britain started to sharply 
decrease during the late 1970s (Brook, 2002; Waddington, 1992), unionism in Germany 
continues to be a strong force. Waddington, Kahmann, and Hoffmann (2005), for example, 
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demonstrate that the German labor market is characterized by coordinated collective 
bargaining over wages and employment wherein union-employer agreements are settled 
initially at the national level and then extended to a large proportion of the labor force.  
Thus, the comparison of the effects of automation on routine jobs across Germany and 
Britain also provides a useful contrast for countries that differ greatly in their protections 
for workers. 
The analyses conducted here confirm that different patterns of polarization 
occurred across Britain and Germany as a result of technological advancement. In Britain, 
the wage premia in routine occupations fell relative to the higher-paid cognitive and lower-
paid manual occupations. The effect of RBTC in Britain benefitted both non-routine 
cognitive workers and non-routine manual workers who moved to other jobs through wage 
increases.  These gains occurred as both employment and wages fell in routine 
occupations. These combined patterns of workers transiting from mid-wage routine 
occupations upwards to non-routine jobs and downwards to manual occupations are 
consistent with patterns of polarization observed in prior studies of the United States 
(Cortes, 2016).  
In contrast, German workers in routine jobs also experienced decreases in 
employment demand and wages; however, the vast majority of employment mobility was 
to higher-paying cognitive occupations.  Wages for workers who transited to the higher 
occupations grew.  No wage growth is observed among manual occupations and there is 
little mobility in Germany from routine to the less well-paid manual occupations.  Thus, in 
Germany, a country characterized by distinct educational and labor market institutions, 
employment and wages did not become polarized by RBTC to the same extent as they 
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were in Britain.  The results for Germany also contrast sharply with the clear pattern of 
polarization reported from prior research for the United States (Cortes, 2016). 
From a theoretical perspective, the analysis shows that the unobserved ability of 
workers, proxied by estimates of individual-by-occupation fixed effects, are strong 
predictors of routine workers’ occupational mobility in both countries. Higher unobserved 
skills among routine workers are positively related to switching to more highly-paid non-
routine cognitive occupations. In Britain, those who have lower levels of unobserved skills 
are also more likely to move to lower-paid non-cognitive manual occupations.  In 
Germany, low-skilled routine workers have little incentive to move down to manual 
occupations because the available pay remains lower than what is available in the routine 
occupations. The observed patterns of worker sorting as well as relative wages are 
consistent with the theoretical framework of the analysis. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 reviews the recent 
literature that examines RBTC among advanced economies. Section 1.3 describes the 
economic model that is used to explain job mobility and wage dynamics across routine, 
manual, and cognitive occupational sectors and its predictions for the effects of RBTC. 
Section 1.4 describes the empirical model used to test the theoretical predictions 
regarding RBTC, while Section 1.5 details the data for each country and variable 
construction. Section 1.6 presents the empirical results of the analysis. Section 1.7 
concludes. 
 
1.2 Literature Review 
Acemoglu and Autor (2011) show that since the 1980s the share of employment in the 
U.S. for both high- and low-skilled occupations increased while the proportion employed 
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in middle-skilled occupations decreased. The increase in employment was concentrated 
in the upper tail of the wage distribution during the 1990s and in the lower tail during the 
2000s. In Britain, Goos and Manning (2007) report a similarly strong polarization pattern 
during the 1980s and 1990s: When employment shares shifted, employment in high- and 
low-paying jobs increased relative to the average. In Germany, Spitz-Oener (2006) reports 
a decline in employment in middle-class occupations during the same period. A large 
literature from the U.S. (Autor, Katz, & Kearney, 2008; Bluestone & Harrison, 1988), Britain 
(Oesch & Rodriguez, 2011), Germany (Antonczyk, Deleire, & Fitzenberger, 2010; 
Dustmann, Ludsteck, & Schönberg, 2009), and other European countries (Albertini, 
Hairault, Langot, & Sopraseuth, 2017; Goos, Manning, & Salomans, 2009, 2014; Michaels 
& Van Reenen, 2014) confirms these general patterns of reductions in employment in the 
middle of the wage distribution with shifts that often increase employment in the tails.  
Over the same period, the wage growth of workers in mid-wage occupations 
declined relative to higher- and lower-paid occupations. In the U.S., Autor, Katz and 
Kearney (2008) document the divergence of upper-tail and lower-tail wage inequality since 
the early 1990s.  They show that the expansion of wage inequality in the lower half stopped 
while the inequality in the higher half continued to widen. The British wage distribution 
experienced increasing inequality during the 1980s and early 1990s (Gosling, Machin, & 
Meghir, 2000).  Similar to the U.S., reductions in wages in lower-paid jobs later slowed 
while those at the top continued to expand (Goos & Manning, 2007). Dustmann, Ludsteck, 
and Schönberg (2009) report that during the 1980s and 1990s, Germany, too, experienced 
increasing wage inequality at the top of the wage distribution, but it differed at the lower 
end distribution because the rise of inequality came a decade later than in the U.S. 
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Analysts have hypothesized that Skill-Biased Technical Change (SBTC) has 
contributed substantially to rising wage inequality since the 1970s and 1980s (Acemoglu, 
1999; Juhn, Murphy, & Pierce, 1993; Katz & Autor, 1999). The SBTC hypothesis proposes 
that the adoption of computers has shifted demand in favor of more educated high-skilled 
workers, and predicts, therefore, that the demand for skilled jobs would rise relative to the 
demand for unskilled jobs. The newest evidence, however, does not support the SBTC 
story: Wages at the bottom of the distribution have increased since the 1990s, and the 
only occupations that have experienced wage declines are mid-wage ones. An alternative 
explanation provided by Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003) is based on the substitutability 
of computers for certain tasks. They report that mid-wage workers occupy jobs that have 
a high concentration of routine tasks using measures from the Dictionary of Occupational 
Titles (DOT).  They argue that the adoption of computers would substitute for workers who 
primarily do routine tasks, because computers follow explicit program rules. This 
phenomenon is described as routinization, or routine-biased technical change (RBTC). 
Autor, Levy, and Murname (2003) also provide evidence that industries that have a high 
proportion of routine skills have most aggressively adopted computers and reduced the 
usage of routine tasks done by human workers by the greatest amount. Oesch and 
Rodriguez (2011) and Spitz-Oener (2006) provide similar evidence for Britain and 
Germany, respectively. 
Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003) use the DOT task measures to categorize the 
occupations into five groups: (1) non-routine manual, (2) routine manual, (3) non-routine 
cognitive/interactive, (4) routine cognitive, and (5) non-routine cognitive/analytical. 
However, more recent work has focused on three aggregated groups of occupations: (1) 
non-routine manual, (2) routine, and (3) non-routine cognitive (Acemoglu & Autor, 2011; 
Autor, Katz, & Kearney, 2006, 2008; Cortes, 2016; Goos, Manning, & Salomons, 2014; 
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Kambourov & Manovskii, 2008). Here, the non-routine manual occupations are primarily 
service jobs. Routine occupations include both the routine cognitive and routine manual 
categories from the earlier work with much emphasis on “set limits, tolerances and 
standards,” and “finger dexterity” (Autor, Levy, & Murnane, 2003). Non-routine cognitive 
occupations include both jobs with a high content of human interaction and quantitative 
analytics. In this paper, I follow this consolidated grouping method to categorize 
occupations into three broadly defined groups based on 3-digit level 2000 Census 
Occupation Codes (COC), following the prior literature.3 4 
Gibbons, Katz, Lemieux, et al. (2005) demonstrate that due to sector-specific 
returns to skills, workers are sorted into different sectors based on their comparative 
advantage in observable and unobservable abilities. The authors also suggest that an 
exogenous shock to the demand of some sector would result in additional mobility across 
sectors. Following this line of thought, Jung and Mercenier (2014) develop a theoretical 
framework to study the effect of different external shocks on labor market mobility. They 
conclude that the theory is more consistent with the RBTC story rather than with SBTC.  
The model usefully provides predictions of how occupational mobility should be related to 
unobservable ability of individuals. Also, according to their theory, the impact on the wage 
premia at the aggregate macro level can be ambiguous which suggests that micro level 
data should be used to investigate the relationship between individual ability, sectoral 
employment, and wages.  
                                                          
3 For further information, please refer to Appendix A of Goos, Manning, and Salomons (2014) and Appendix 
C of Cortes (2016).  
4 Because the Cross-National Equivalent File pre-harmonizes the occupation variables into ISCO-88 at the 
4-digit level, a crosswalk between ISCO-88 and COC 2000 is needed to map the occupations in BHPS and 
SOEP into the three groups of occupations. 
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Cortes (2016), who adapted their theory, mainly concentrated on predictions of 
individual occupational switching patterns due to declining wage premia in routine 
occupations. He provides evidence of strong self-selection based on unobserved ability 
as individuals switch out of routine occupations. Among routine occupational workers, 
those with higher unobserved skills upgrade to non-routine cognitive occupations and 
those with lower proxy measures of unobserved skills downgrade to non-routine manual 
occupations. Using Danish Administrative data, Groes, Kircher, and Manovskii (2015) 
report that, in a given occupation, workers at the extremes of the wage distribution (the 
most and the least paid) are more likely to switch out of this occupation.  Here, building on 
the prior work of Jung and Mercenier (2014) and Cortes (2016), I similarly examine 
patterns of occupational job dynamics and wage growth, focusing on the role of 
unobserved ability. 
In a competitive labor market, workers are sorted into occupations on the basis of 
their skill levels, are paid by their skill levels, and switch among occupations based on 
their skill levels. Some qualities of worker skill are measured but other aspects are not.  
Therefore, a natural empirical question is how to identify workers’ unobservable skills. 
Previous studies of routine-biased technical change have mainly used repeated cross-
sectional data, like the Current Population Survey in the U.S. (Autor, Katz, & Kearney, 
2009) or the Labor Force Survey in Britain (Goos & Manning, 2007). Cortes (2016) was 
the first to use longitudinal micro-level data (The Panel Study of Income Dynamics) to 
study the U.S. occupational mobility related to labor market polarization. He takes 
advantage of panel data to provide insight into the role of the individual’s occupation-
specific unobservable abilities in driving patterns of occupational mobility and wage 
growth. In a similar vein, I use longitudinal household data at the individual level to 
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compare labor market dynamics associated with RBTC in two European countries, Britain 
and Germany, using the BHPS and SOEP, respectively. 
Like Cortes (2016), I use the panel data to provide empirical evidence that the 
occupational mobility of a worker is strongly related to the worker’s unobservable skill 
level. In both countries, higher-ability workers from routine occupations tend to switch to 
higher-paid non-routine cognitive occupations and immediately benefit from these 
switches through higher wage growth. Among routine workers in Britain, downgrading to 
non-routine manual occupations is more likely to occur at the lower tail of the ability 
distribution, yet it still induces higher wage growth. In Germany, low-ability workers show 
a much smaller tendency to switch to manual occupations. Thus, the German labor market 
is characterized by what appears to be a more desirable outcome related to RBTC:  
workers are principally moving up to higher-paid jobs with faster wage growth in a country 
with an educational system more focused on development of specific occupational skills 
and stronger workplace protections for workers.  
 
1.3 Theoretical Framework 
1.3.1 Model Setup 
This section I present a summary of the occupational sorting theory from Jung and 
Mercenier (2014) combined with the predicted effects of RBTC developed by Cortes 
(2016) that is based on Jung and Mercenier’s theory. In addition, I discuss the relative 
wage premium changes and occupational mobility under two distinct conditions of the 
general equilibrium model to correspond to the different patterns in British and German 
labor markets, respectively.  
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In this model, workers are distributed on one dimension of skill, and all the labor 
market participants, including the workers and employers, have complete information of 
the workers’ skill levels. There are three occupations: non-routine manual (M), routine (R) 
and non-routine cognitive (C). According to Gibbons, Katz, Lemieux, and Parent (2005), 
a worker with skill level 𝑧 is sorted into one of the above occupations based on their 
comparative advantage. The worker’s productivity is given by 𝜑𝑗(𝑧) for performing task 
𝑗 ∈ {𝑀, 𝑅, 𝐶}. Here the model assumes that high-ability workers, meaning those with a high 
value of 𝑧, are more productive for all tasks, especially for the more complex ones. Thus, 
the return to skill is the highest for cognitive and lowest for manual workers. Therefore, we 
have the following relations: 
0 <
𝑑ln⁡𝜑𝑀(𝑧)
𝑑𝑧
<
𝑑ln⁡𝜑𝑅(𝑧)
𝑑𝑧
<
𝑑ln⁡𝜑𝐶(𝑧)
𝑑𝑧
                              [1] 
For high-ability workers, when 𝑧 approaches the upper tail of the distribution, productivity 
grows faster; for low-ability workers, productivity decreases slower when 𝑧 approaches 
the lower tail. The productivity  𝜑𝑗(𝑧) is measured in efficiency units, so the wage for 
worker  𝑖 in occupation  𝑗 is then given by the following function: 𝑤𝑗(𝑧) = 𝜆𝑗𝜑𝑗(𝑧), where 
𝜆𝑗  is the wage per efficiency unit in occupation  𝑗 ∈ {𝑀, 𝑅, 𝐶} . Here, 𝜆𝑗  can also be 
interpreted as the occupational-specific wage premium. So, taking the logarithm of the 
wage function, the wage function then takes the following form:  
ln⁡𝑤𝑗(𝑧) = ln⁡𝜆𝑗 + ln⁡𝜑𝑗(𝑧)                                                  [2] 
ln⁡𝜆𝑗 gives the intersect of each log-wage function for occupation 𝑗.  
Figure 1.1 (a) plots the ln⁡𝑤𝑗(𝑧) functions for the three types of occupations where 
the y-axis is the log wage and x-axis is the workers skill level 𝑧. Each line represents the 
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potential log-wage income for the worker with skill level 𝑧. Here ln⁡𝜑𝑗(𝑧) in the log-wage 
function is assumed to be linear with the lowest slope for manual and highest slope for 
cognitive occupations. And the intercepts ln⁡𝜆𝑗 are assumed to have the following relations 
among these occupations: ln 𝜆𝐶 < ln 𝜆𝑅 < ln⁡𝜆𝑀.
5  
[Insert Figure 1.1] 
At the initial equilibrium, as shown in Figure 1.1 (a), if workers are to maximize 
their wage incomes, they would select themselves into one of these lines based on their 
skill levels relative to the kink points 𝑧1and 𝑧2. For workers with ability lower than 𝑧1, 
comparing the dashed lines for routine and non-routine cognitive occupations, they would 
be better off working in the manual occupation. Similar arguments also can be made for 
workers between 𝑧1and 𝑧2, who will select into the routine occupation, and above 𝑧2, who 
then select into the cognitive occupation.  
1.3.2 Labor Market Effects of RBTC 
Technology and computers are assumed to affect workers with different task contents 
differently: the newly adopted capital substitutes for labor in routine tasks and complement 
labor in abstract tasks. This would affect the labor market in two ways: It decreases the 
demand for routine workers and therefore suppresses the wage in this sector, and 
increases the demand for non-routine cognitive workers and yields a higher wage in this 
sector. The patterns from my British and German data match to each of these two 
scenarios perfectly. To discuss these two effects separately, I use the two plots in Figure 
                                                          
5 If ln⁡𝜆𝐶 , ln⁡𝜆𝑅  and ln⁡𝜆𝑀 are not ordered in this way, they either equal or reverse the relation, the line for 
cognitive occupation would be above others, and, therefore, all individuals would choose to work in 
cognitive and no one would want to work in other occupations. 
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1.1 (b) and (c) to illustrate how the supply side of the labor market responds to the wage 
premia changes. 
Figure 1.1 (b) shows the effect from the lowered wage premium in the routine 
occupation due to the decreasing demand. As a result, 𝜆𝑅 would go down to  𝜆𝑅
′  where 
𝜆𝑅
′ < 𝜆𝑅, and the routine occupation line would shift downward to the darker black line. 
Now, we have the new kink points, 𝑧1
′  and 𝑧2
′ . Therefore, workers between the old and 
new kink points would find switching to a different line to be optimal. Workers between 𝑧1 
and 𝑧1
′  would switch to the extension of the manual occupation line and make a higher 
wage relative to the dashed routine occupation line if they otherwise chose to stay. And 
the closer to the lower end of the ability distribution in routine occupation, the higher the 
incentive of switching the worker should have. On the other side of the routine occupation, 
workers between 𝑧2 and 𝑧2
′  would switch to the extension of the cognitive line to maximize 
their wage incomes for the same reason. And the closer to the higher end of the ability 
distribution will have a stronger incentive to switch as well. As a result of the declining 
wage premia of the routine occupation relative to other sectors, workers at the extremes 
of the ability distribution would switch out of the routine occupation, and the direction of 
switching is related to their skill levels. The aggregate consequence is the shrink of labor 
in the routine occupation, from  𝑧1-- 𝑧2 to 𝑧1
′  -- 𝑧2
′ , and the expanding labor forces in the 
cognitive and manual sectors. 
Figure 1.1 (c) presents a different scenario where the main effect from RBTC is to 
push up the wage premia for workers in the non-routine cognitive occupation, namely it 
has 𝜆𝐶
" > 𝜆𝐶, and therefore shifts the line of the cognitive occupation upward to the darker 
black one. The new line representing the wage premia of cognitive workers would result 
in a new kink point 𝑧2
"  at the high end of routine. For the relatively high-ability workers in 
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the routine occupation, the outcome is similar: Workers between 𝑧2 and 𝑧2
"  are better off if 
they switch to the cognitive occupation and earn higher wages (dark solid line) rather than 
staying (dashed line as the extension of routine). Thus, in contrast to the above scenario 
shown in Figure 1.1 (b), the switching would concentrate in the high-ability workers in the 
routine occupation and does not occur among the low-ability workers. The aggregate 
consequence of the increased wage premia for cognitive workers is declining employment 
in the routine occupation and the expanding labor force in the cognitive occupation, 
leaving employment in the manual occupation unchanged.  
 
1.4 Empirical Methodology 
This section follows the identification strategy using panel data of Cortes (2016) to 
empirically implement the above theoretical framework in order to test the predicted effect 
of RBTC. 
From section 1.2, the individual occupation-specific productivity function takes a 
log-linear form, and therefore it can be written as: 
ln⁡𝜑𝑗(𝑧𝑖) = 𝑎𝑗𝑧𝑖                                                                    [3] 
where 𝑎𝑗 are the occupation-specific returns to skill for occupations 𝑗 ∈ {𝑀, 𝑅, 𝐶}, and are 
the slopes of the plots in Figure 1.1. Therefore, we can replace the ln⁡𝜑𝑗(z) in the log-
wage expression shown as function [2] and write it as follows: 
ln⁡𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑡 = ln⁡𝜆𝑗𝑡 + 𝑎𝑗𝑧𝑖                                                              [4] 
Here, ln⁡𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑡  represents the log wage of individual 𝑖  in occupation 𝑗  at time 𝑡 . The 
expression of log wage has two components. The first term is the log of occupation-
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specific wage per efficiency unit, which is the same for all workers employed in this 
occupation. The second term is the individual productivity function for the specific 
occupation, which can be used to sort workers according to their endowed abilities. In 
practice, from the empirical perspective, ln⁡𝜆𝑗𝑡 is replaced with a single parameter 𝜃𝑗𝑡. And 
because here I am not trying to identify the true value of 𝑎𝑗 and 𝑧𝑖, but rather to sort the 
individuals based on 𝑧𝑖 in a given occupation 𝑗, I can replace the term 𝑎𝑗𝑧𝑖 with 𝛾𝑖𝑗, which 
indicates the worker’s occupation-specific productivity. Therefore, I can rewrite the 
function [4] as the following form for regression analysis: 
ln⁡𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑡 =∑ 𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡𝜃𝑗𝑡
𝑗
+∑ 𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡𝛾𝑖𝑗
𝑗
+ 𝜇𝑖𝑡                                            [5] 
𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the indicator for whether the individual 𝑖 works in occupation 𝑗 at time 𝑡, and 𝜇𝑖𝑡 is 
the error term. 𝜃𝑗𝑡 can be interpreted as the occupational wage premia for occupation 𝑗 at 
time 𝑡 . 𝛾𝑖𝑗  is the individual-occupation fixed effect which represents the worker’s 
occupation-specific productivity. Additionally, 𝛾𝑖𝑗 for individual 𝑖 can vary across different 
occupations but should be constant within the same occupation. Thus, we can estimate 
𝛾𝑖𝑗 at the individual-by-occupation-spell level. 
In the above model, 𝜃𝑗𝑡 and 𝛾𝑖𝑗 are the coefficients of interest in this paper. The 
former one is used to trace the trends of occupational wage premia in each sector and the 
latter one is to sort the workers’ unobservable skill levels in each occupation. As this study 
is not aiming to identify the true levels of occupational wage premia but to capture the 
relative changes of the wage premia for each occupation in each year, the non-routine 
manual occupation is omitted. This means the 𝜃𝑀𝑡 are set to be zero for all years as the 
relative benchmark for other occupations. This strategy excludes the aggregate year effect 
on wage, and leaves the estimates of 𝜃𝑅𝑡 and 𝜃𝐶𝑡 to reflect the relative changes of wage 
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premia in routine occupation and non-routine cognitive occupation compared with the 
omitted category—manual occupation—over time. The 𝜃𝑗𝑡  are captured by the 
parameters associated with the variables that interact the occupation and year dummies. 
Therefore, 𝜃𝑅𝑡 and 𝜃𝐶𝑡 capture the double differences of the wage premia change relative 
to the base year (year 1 in this paper) and to the analogous change of the omitted 
occupation (manual). Thus, the estimated 𝜃𝑅𝑡 and 𝜃𝐶𝑡 will provide the effect of RBTC on 
the wage premia of the entire occupation on a yearly basis for the routine and cognitive 
occupations relative to the manual occupation.  
The other parameter of interest in this model is the individual-by-occupation-spell 
fixed effect 𝛾𝑖𝑗, which can be captured by the parameters associated with the variables 
that interact with the individual and occupation dummies. Recall that 𝛾𝑖𝑗 = 𝑎𝑗𝑧𝑖 , which 
includes two components, occupation-specific return to skill and individual unobservable 
time-invariant skill level. 𝛾𝑖𝑗  therefore captures the individual 𝑖’s productivity in a given 
occupation 𝑗. By estimating 𝛾𝑖𝑗 with the fixed effect model, I can then have the relative 
ranking information of all the workers in a specific occupation. This allows study to 
examine how the wage premia affected by RBTC influence workers’ occupational mobility 
for individuals with different skill levels across occupational categories.  
To reduce potential omitted variable bias in the model, a set of control variables 
are included the regression—age, gender, education, industry, etc. Therefore, I have the 
following empirical model for estimation: 
ln⁡𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑡 =∑ 𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡𝜃𝑗𝑡
𝑗
+∑ 𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡𝛾𝑖𝑗
𝑗
+ 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽𝑋 +𝐻𝑖𝑡𝛽𝐻 + 𝑍𝑖𝑡𝛽𝑍 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡        [6] 
where 𝑋𝑖𝑡  is a set of individual demographic characteristics, including gender, age, 
citizenship, number of children, and marriage status. 𝐻𝑖𝑡 is a vector of the worker’s human 
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capital indicators, such as educational attainment and job tenure. 𝑍𝑖𝑡 is a vector of other 
controls, including industry and year dummies. In all the estimations, standard errors are 
clustered at the individual level. 
1.5 Data Description 
This project uses British Household Panel Study (BHPS) and German Socio-Economic 
Panel (SOEP) data with additional pre-harmonized variables provided by the Cross-
National Equivalent File (CNEF).6  (Burkhauser & Lillard, 2000; Frick et al., 2007). Both 
BHPS and SOEP are longitudinal household-level surveys that follow the same groups of 
representative households within the nation’s population.  
The first wave of BHPS was launched by the Institute for Social and Economic 
Research at Britain’s University of Essex in 1991, and has conducted annual interviews 
every subsequent year. 5,505 households and 10,264 individuals from 250 areas of Great 
Britain entered the first wave. Beginning in 1999, samples of 1,500 households in both 
Scotland and Wales were added to the main sample. The fieldwork typically starts during 
the September of each wave year and runs through the following spring. The reference 
year regarding the individual labor earnings is from September in the year prior to the 
interview until September in the year in which interviewing begins. 
The German Institute for Economic Research, Deutsches Institut für 
Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) Berlin, began fielding the SOEP in 1984. There are 12,245 
individuals from 5,921 households who were successfully interviewed by the fieldwork 
organization, TNS Infratest Sozialforschung, for the first wave. And since then, nearly 
11,000 households and about 30,000 persons have been sampled every year. The 
                                                          
6 More information can be found on the following website: https://cnef.ehe.osu.edu/. 
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fieldwork typically starts at the end of January and lasts for nine months. The most recent 
available wave was surveyed in 2015 (Wave 32). The reference year is defined as the 
previous calendar year for each wave, which is different from BHPS, due to the nature of 
the fieldwork strategy. But this minor difference would not be expected to have any 
fundamental impact on the empirical results. A randomly selected 95% of the observations 
from the original survey data are available in the public use version of the SOEP for this 
study. 
The CNEF 1970-2013, prepared by Dean Lillard and currently housed in the 
Department of Human Sciences at the Ohio State University contains uniformly recoded 
(or harmonized) variables that are transformed across the surveys it includes in order for 
the measures to be made consistent. The harmonization of the data is carried out in 
collaboration with the institutes that are responsible for the surveys contained in the CNEF. 
The CNEF usefully contains many variables used in this study such as years of education, 
individual labor earnings, occupations, and industries. The measures of labor earnings 
include all payments received from employment during the reference year, including the 
pay from any current job that started before the end of the reference year and the pay 
from a previous job that ends after the beginning of the reference year. Occupational 
codes are available at the 4-digit level of the International Standard Classification of 
Occupations from 1988 (ISCO88) and 2-digital level industry codes are also available 
based on the European industry standard classification, Nomenclature des Activités 
Économiques dans la Communauté Européenne (NACE). 
In each country’s data set, I identify all full-time workers for the entire reference 
year from 1999 to 2008 because the individual labor earnings variable is an annual sum. 
Thus, observations of individuals who experienced any period of non-full-time employment 
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or unemployment during the reference year will not be included in my sample. 
Occupations are recorded based on the reports from the interview respondents regarding 
their jobs during the reference years. If any individual changed jobs (while remaining full-
time) during the reference year without an interruption, the new occupation is treated as 
their occupation for the reference year.  
Following prior work in this literature (Cortes, 2016; Kambourov & Manovskii, 
2008), this study excludes members of the armed forces and agricultural workers. I also 
exclude temporary workers and the self-employed. The samples include both male and 
female workers from the public and private sectors. Workers’ ages range from 16 to 64. 
1.5.1 Occupational Grouping by Task Content 
This paper follows Acemoglu and Autor (2011) and Cortes (2016) to group occupations 
into three broadly defined categories: non-routine manual, routine, and non-routine 
cognitive.  Non-routine refers to service jobs that have high values of the U.S. Labor 
Department’s Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) task measure “eye-hand-foot 
coordination.” Routine occupations mainly include blue-collar jobs and some white-collar 
jobs, such as operative, installation, clerical, and administrative works. These jobs have 
high measures in “set limits, tolerances and standards” and “finger dexterity.” Non-routine 
cognitive occupations are those involving “direction, control and planning” or that have 
high content of “GED math,” and may include management and professional jobs. Autor, 
Levy, and Murnane (2003) originally developed five categories for the types of tasks 
performed across occupations in the CPS data, and then Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2006) 
collapse them into the three measures described here. Goos, Manning, and Salomons 
(2014) also follow the same strategy in grouping the 2-digit level ISCO-88 occupational 
codes into three categories. 
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[Insert Table 1.1] 
Table 1.1 provides the grouping method of the occupations based on the 3-digit 
U.S. census COC 2000 codes, which is also the method used by Cortes (2016). The task 
labels are based on Acemoglu and Autor (2011) and the groupings are based on 
Kambourov and Manovskii (2008). Armed forces and agricultural occupations are not 
classified in this study and are excluded from the samples. Because the CNEF pre-
harmonizes the occupation variables into ISCO-88 at the 4-digit level for both BHPS and 
SOEP, I map the occupations in these data into the three groups, making use of a 
crosswalk between the ISCO-88 and COC 2000 codes provided by the U.S. National 
Crosswalk Service Center.7 There are 324 individual occupations in the British sample 
and 305 in the German sample based on the ISCO-88 codes. A few of these occupations 
are mapped into multiple categories. I manually assign them and the empirical results 
show little sensitivity to those coding decisions.  
1.5.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1.2 reports descriptive statistics for the British sample, including the sample size, 
gender, average labor earnings, occupational employment shares, and ages. There are 
37,129 total observations spanning the ten-year sample period, which starts with more 
than 4,000 in 1999 and declines to near 3,000.  About 58% of the workers are male. The 
average of nominal labor earnings is around £16,626 in 1999 and then constantly goes up 
each year until it reaches to £24,122 in 2008. The real labor earnings adjusted by the 
inflation also show a steady increasing trend with a smaller rate.8 Overall, 46% of the 
                                                          
7 The crosswalk between ISCO-88 and COC 2000 can be accessed from the following link: 
http://www.xwalkcenter.org/.  
8 The inflation (CPI) rates for Britain and Germany can be found on the OECD website: 
https://data.oecd.org/price/inflation-cpi.htm. Here the base year is 1999. 
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observations are in the routine occupational category. More importantly, the share of the 
routine occupations is 49.73% at the beginning of the period and decreases to around 
40.47%. Meanwhile, employment share of cognitive occupations goes up from 38.82% to 
43.88% while manual occupations also goes up from 11.45% to 15.65%. The declining 
trend of employment share of routine occupations and the increasing trends in non-routine 
occupations are consistent through the ten-year period. More than 53% of the 
observations are recorded between ages 30 and 50. 
In Germany, as reported in Table 1.3, the sample contains 55,897 observations 
where two-thirds of them are male workers. The average of labor earnings increases 
constantly from €32,267 in 1999 to €39,576 through the years. However, the labor 
earnings adjusted by the inflation show an increasing trend between 1999 and 2002 and 
then a decreasing trend between 2003 and 2008. This trend is possibly enhanced by the 
higher inflation rates during the latter years and the by the recession beginning 2003. But 
the fluctuation in the yearly trends will be captured by the year fixed effects in the empirical 
strategy. German routine occupations also decline from 54.60% in 1999 to 47.36% in 
2008, which is similar to the British data. However, contrary to what has shown in Britain, 
the decreased share of routine has been almost offset by cognitive occupations while 
manual occupations show little change. The share of cognitive occupations increases from 
36.78% to 44.52% and the share of manual occupations shows some fluctuation with 
minor changes. The age range between 30 and 50 includes 61% of the total sample. 
[Insert Table 1.2] 
[Insert Table 1.3] 
The statistics of the samples from these two countries show very different patterns 
at the aggregate level. In Britain, both the cognitive and manual occupations expand their 
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shares of employment to offset the declined share of the routine occupations. In Germany, 
the occupational outflow from routine seems to be one direction towards the higher-paid 
cognitive occupations and few routine workers downgrade to manual occupations. In 
section 1.6, I provide the detailed individual level evidence of the occupational mobilities 
as the result of different wage premia patterns in the two countries. 
1.5.3 Employment Share 
Figure 1.2 shows the employment share changes of the three occupational categories in 
Britain over the ten-year period from 1999 to 2008. Consistent with the descriptive 
statistics shown in the previous section, the dark gray bar in Figure 1.2(a) shows that 
employment of the routine occupations has declined. 9.26% of the employment in routine 
goes to other occupations—they split almost equally into non-routine cognitive and non-
routine manual. Employment in the cognitive occupational category increases 5.06% 
(black bar) and employment in the manual category increases 4.1% (light gray bar). Figure 
1.2(b) gives the evolution of the employment shares in the three occupational categories 
for each year from 1999 through 2008. As the employment share of the routine 
occupational category (dark gray shading) decreases over time, the employment share of 
the cognitive occupational category (black shading) increases, and so does the share of 
employment in the manual occupational category (light gray shading). These trends are 
consistently continuous over this period. 
[Insert Figure 1.2] 
Figure 1.3 contains analogous information regarding employment shares over time 
in the German labor market during the same period. Figure 1.3(a) gives the overall 
changes of the employment shares for the three occupational categories over the entire 
sample period.  Figure 1.3(b) depicts the evolution of the employment shares across the 
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three occupational categories on an annual basis during the sample period. Similar to the 
British labor market, the employment share within the routine occupational category in 
Germany also decreases by 7.24%. But contrary to Great Britain, in Germany the 
decrease of the share of employment in the routine occupational category is almost 
entirely offset by the increase in the share of employment in the cognitive occupational 
category. The share of employment in manual occupations has changed little over the ten 
years of the sample period. This pattern is visible in both panels in Figure 1.3. 
[Insert Figure 1.3] 
The changes of occupational employment shares in these two economies follow 
somewhat different patterns that correspond to the two scenarios in the theory shown in 
Figure 1.1 (b) and (c). The British pattern matches Figure 1.1 (b) as the main driving force 
of the opposite directions of outflow from routine occupation workers is the relative 
decreasing wage premia in the routine occupations. The German pattern matches Figure 
1.1 (c) as the main driving force of the uni-directional flow of employment from routine to 
cognitive occupations.  This logically would be driven by the increasing wage premia in 
the cognitive occupations and suggests that technological adoption may have affected 
returns to workers somewhat differently in the two countries. The rest of the paper will 
make use of micro-level longitudinal data to explore whether these theoretical 
perspectives are consistent with the individual level evidence. 
1.5.4 Trends of Average Wages 
One important assumption of the theory presented in section 1.2 is that the three 
categories of occupations are ranked with those working in the cognitive occupational 
category as the highest-paid group, those in the routine occupational category as the mid-
wage group, and the manual occupational category as the least-paid group.  Figure 1.4 
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presents the average labor earnings of the workers in these three categories in each year 
with the British data shown in Figure 1.4 (a) and the German data shown in Figure 1.4 (b), 
respectively. The statistical data in each panel of the Figure do order the average 
occupational wage levels in a manner consistent with the theoretical model that motivates 
the analysis in both countries.  Average wages of the cognitive occupational category are 
the highest, the routine occupations are in the middle, and the manual occupations have 
the lowest average pay. The gap between the mean wages of the cognitive and routine 
occupational groups is larger than the gap between the routine and manual groups in both 
countries. Another noticeable characteristic of the wage earnings, as shown in Figure 1.4, 
is that all occupations exhibit increasing average labor earning trends through the period 
of study even though they may grow at different rates. 
[Insert Figure 1.4] 
 
1.6 Empirical Results 
In the previous section, it was shown that in Britain, the employment share of routine 
occupations decreases 9.26%, accompanying the similar increases of the share in both 
cognitive and manual occupations. This aggregate level pattern implies that, for the 
occupational mobility at the micro level, the number of routine workers who transit down 
to manual jobs is similar to the number of those who transit upwards to cognitive jobs. 
During the same period, the German data show that the decrease of the employment 
share in routine occupations has been almost exclusively offset by the increase of the 
employment share in cognitive occupations, and imply a largely single direction of 
occupational switching flowing from routine to cognitive occupations at the micro level. 
This section provides detailed empirical results using the fixed-effect model from equation 
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[6] in section 1.3.  The focus of this analysis is to examine changing occupational wage 
premia over time for the three categories of occupational tasks and then also to obtain 
estimates of specific individual skills that will be used in estimates relating individual skill 
to occupational switching patterns. 
1.6.1 Occupational Wage Premia 
The RBTC hypothesis assumes that the adoption of new technology and computers 
affects workers doing different tasks in different ways: by replacing routine task workers 
and by complementing abstract task workers. Therefore, the decreasing demand for 
routine workers would suppress the wage premia in routine occupations, and the 
increasing demand for cognitive workers would push up the wage premia. By estimating 
𝜃𝑗𝑡  from equation [6] for routine and cognitive occupations, respectively, 𝜃𝑅𝑡  and 𝜃𝐶𝑡 
capture the difference-in-difference wage premia relative to the base year and to the base 
occupational category. Here the omitted base occupations are non-routine manual 
occupations. And, in practice, 𝜃𝑅𝑡 and 𝜃𝐶𝑡 are the occupation by year fixed effects. 
1.6.1.1 Occupational Wage Premia in Britain 
Table 1.4 presents the estimates of 𝜃𝑅𝑡 and 𝜃𝐶𝑡 from year 2 (2000) to year 10 (2008) by 
the fixed effect model with different controls using BHPS data from Britain. The first two 
columns are from the model that only includes the year dummies and the individual 
demographic characteristics. Recall that the omitted year is the first year in my sample 
(1999), and the omitted category is the manual occupations; the coefficients in the first 
column show the changes in wage premia of non-routine cognitive occupations for each 
future year compared with the base year relative to the change analogue of non-routine 
manual occupations. In other words, each coefficient in this column shows the difference 
in wage premia growth rates of these two occupational categories. The dependent variable 
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is log wage. Therefore, the coefficient in column one and row one shows, relative to the 
wage premia growth in manual occupations, wage premia in cognitive occupations grow 
2.8% faster. And along the first column, the coefficients show that, for many years, the 
wage premia in cognitive occupations have grown faster than manual occupations. Such 
growth differences are statistically significant at the 5 percent level for years 9 and 10, or 
at the 10 percent level for years 2 and 5. 
The second column indicates the wage premia growth in routine occupations for 
each year compared with the base year, relative to the analogue growth in manual 
occupations. For many years in this column (year 6 to year 10), coefficients are negative 
and significant at the 1 percent level. This demonstrates that the wage premia in routine 
occupations experienced a much slower growth relative to the manual occupations, and 
even slower growth relative to the cognitive occupations. Take the year 6, for instance: 
The coefficient here shows that, compared with the wage growth of manual occupations 
between year 1 and year 6, wage premia growth in routine occupations is 5.3% slower 
during the same period.  
The results shown in model 1 from Table 1.4 describes the strongly polarized labor 
market in Britain: The middle-paid routine occupations experience a significantly slower 
wage growth relative to the top- and bottom-paid sectors from 1999 to 2008, while 
cognitive occupations show a slightly faster wage growth rate than manual occupations. 
Models 2 and 3 include additional controls into the regressions. Model 2 adds human 
capital indicators, including the individual’s educational achievement, job tenure, and the 
square of job tenure. In addition to model 2, model 3 includes industry dummies. And the 
results across different models are robust with different controls.  
[Insert Table 1.4] 
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To better understand the polarized pattern in the British labor market, I plot the 
coefficients from the last two columns with the most sophisticated regression model in 
Figure 1.5 (a). The blue solid line shows how the wage premia grow in cognitive 
occupations relative to the growth of manual occupations. In general, it has an upward 
trend through the period of study. The red dashed line, on the other hand, shows a 
negative trend with a much steeper slope, which means a significantly slower wage growth 
relative to the manual occupations. 
The polarized pattern of the British labor market shown by Table 1.4 and Figure 
1.5 (a) is consistent with the prediction of the theory as shown in Figure 1.1 (b), and also 
consistent with the U-shape of aggregate employment share changes in Figure 1.2. 
[Insert Figure 1.5] 
1.6.1.2 Occupational Wage Premia in Germany 
Table 1.5 presents the estimates of occupation-year fixed effects 𝜃𝑅𝑡 and 𝜃𝐶𝑡 from year 2 
(2000) to year 10 (2008) using German SOEP data. Similar to Table 1.4 shown in the 
previous section about the British data, coefficients in columns 1 and 2 indicate the wage 
premia growth in Germany for cognitive and routine occupations, respectively, relative to 
the analogue growth for manual occupations. And Table 1.5 also shows the coefficients 
from three different models: Model 1 only includes year dummies and individual 
demographic characteristics; model 2 adds human capital controls, including both 
education and tenure indicators; model 3 is the most sophisticated model with additional 
industry dummies. 
Table 1.5 presents the coefficients estimated for the German labor market. As 
shown in column 1, for many years (year 6 to year 10), non-routine cognitive occupations 
experience a much faster wage growth relative to manual occupations, as the coefficients 
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shown in these years are positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. They 
indicate that the wage growth in cognitive occupations during these years are 3.6% to 
6.6% faster than the growth in manual occupations, and are higher than the values shown 
in Table 1.4 and are also statistically significant at a higher level.  
On the contrary, column 2 in Table 1.5 shows that the relative wage growth in 
routine occupations is not much different from the growth in manual occupations. The 
coefficients here are not statistically significant despite the negative magnitudes. This is 
different from the British labor market as the British data show a much steeper downward 
trend for routine occupations relative to manual occupations. Therefore, the difference of 
wage premium patterns between Britain and Germany is consistent with the occupational 
mobility. While wage premia of routine occupations decline relative to the manual 
occupations, British routine workers switch to manual occupations. However, I do not see 
such mobility from routine to manual in Germany, as shown in section 1.5. And the 
estimated relative wage premia shown in Table 1.5 provide the evidence for the little 
incentive of German routine workers downgrading to manual. Models with different 
controls show that the results are robust across columns. 
[Insert Table 1.5] 
Combining the results for the relative wage growths in both cognitive and manual 
occupations, a clear pattern in the German labor market can be described as a relatively 
faster wage growth in non-routine cognitive occupations than in routine and manual, where 
the latter two have similar wage growth rates. This pattern is plotted in Figure 1.5 (b) using 
the coefficients from the last two columns in Table 1.5. The blue solid line increases 
continuously with higher magnitudes and a higher significance level from year 6 and 
onward, where the red dashed line stays relatively flat right below zero with no statistical 
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significance. To compare Figure 1.5 (a) and (b), the German labor market shows a 
distinctly different pattern from Britain. 
The pattern of the German labor market shown in Table 1.5 and Figure 1.5 (b) is 
also consistent with the prediction of the theory as shown in Figure 1.1 (c), and with the 
patterns of employment shares shown in Figure 1.3. 
1.6.2 Occupational Switching Patterns on Ability 
As shown in the theory of the self-selection and the prediction of occupational mobility as 
described in section 1.2, the individuals in the routine occupations respond to the changes 
of relative wage premia based on their underlying unobservable skill levels. The empirical 
model from equation [6] provides a strategy to identify the individual’s time-invariant 
occupational specific productivity 𝛾𝑖𝑗  using fixed effect model. This sector provides the 
empirical evidence of occupational mobility out of routine occupations toward non-routine 
occupations related to the estimated individual unobservable 𝛾𝑖𝑅  among routine 
occupations workers. 
1.6.2.1 Individual Occupational Mobility in Britain 
In Figure 1.6, I show the probability of switching out of routine occupations on the 
distribution of routine workers’ unobservable abilities, where their abilities are obtained 
from the individual-by-occupation-spell fixed effect 𝛾𝑖𝑅. In Figure 1.6 (a), the estimated 
individual unobservable abilities are ranked into five quintiles as shown in the horizontal 
axis. The black and gray bars at each quintile show the probabilities of switching into non-
routine cognitive and manual occupations, respectively, among workers with similar 
abilities. The black bars overall show higher values than the gray bars, implying routine 
workers in Britain are, in general, more likely to switch to cognitive occupations than to 
manual.  
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More importantly, the probabilities of switching to cognitive occupations show a 
consistently positive relation to the individual unobservable abilities, and the probabilities 
of switching to manual show a negative relation to the unobservable abilities. Among 
routine occupations workers, switching to non-routine cognitive occupations is more likely 
to occur at the higher end of the ability distribution, as shown by the monotonously 
increasing black bar when approaching the higher ability quintiles in Figure 1.6 (a). And 
switching to non-routine manual occupations is more likely to occur at the lower end of the 
ability distribution, as shown by the higher gray bars near the lower quintiles in Figure 1.6 
(a). 
[Insert Figure 1.6] 
To estimate how the worker’s underlying ability affects the probability of switching 
to a certain occupation that is not routine, I run the linear probability model on the 
estimated individual-by-occupation-spell fixed effects 𝛾𝑖𝑅, with the regressand as a binary 
variable that equals to one if the worker switches to a certain different occupational 
category and otherwise equals zero. The results are presented in Table 1.6 for the British 
labor market.  
The first column shows the results of the model for switching to non-routine 
cognitive occupations on the estimated individual-by-occupation fixed effects, which is 
standardized after the wage estimate of equation [6]. The coefficient indicates that with 
one standard error increase in the estimated individual-by-occupation fixed effect, the 
probability of switching to cognitive occupations out of routine occupations is 6.2% higher. 
Column 2 in Table 1.6 shows the result from the linear probability model with the binary 
variable of switching to manual occupations as the regressand, and it indicates that with 
one standard error increase in the estimated 𝛾𝑖𝑅, the probability of switching to manual 
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decreases by 1.5%. And both coefficients are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
Columns 3 and 4 use the quantiles of the estimated 𝛾𝑖𝑅  as the regressors, and show 
similar results. 
[Insert Table 1.6] 
The switching patterns in the British labor market are consistent with the theoretical 
prediction shown in Figure 1.1 (b) and the aggregate employment changes shown in 
Figure 1.2.  
1.6.2.2 Individual Occupational Mobility in Germany 
Among routine workers in Germany, switching to cognitive occupations has a similar 
pattern as in Britain, shown by the black bars in Figure 1.6 (b). The horizontal axis is still 
the ability quantiles that constructed from 𝛾𝑖𝑅 , which are estimated by the fixed effect 
model from equation [6]. Figure 1.6 indicates that switching to cognitive occupations is 
also more likely to occur among the higher ability workers in Germany. And the probability 
of switching to manual occupations is close to zero for high ability routine workers. 
However, even though workers in the lower half of the ability distribution have relatively 
higher probability of switching to manual, the probability does not increase significantly 
when the ability moves from the third quintile to the first quintile, which is different from the 
rising gray bars towards the lower end in Figure 1.6 (a) for Britain. This indicates the lower 
incentive for German routine workers switching to manual because of the relatively stable 
wage premia between these two occupations as shown in section 1.5.1. 
[Insert Table 1.7] 
Table 1.7 presents the results for the German data from the linear probability 
model with the regressand as the binary variable indicating whether the worker switches, 
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and the regressors are the standardized individual-by-occupation fixed effects 𝛾𝑖𝑅 . 
Column 1 indicates that with one standard error increase in 𝛾𝑖𝑅, the probability of switching 
to cognitive occupations increases by 5.7%, a number that is very close to the first column 
in Table 1.6 for the British data. However, column 2 shows a much smaller coefficient in 
terms of magnitude, compared to the one in Britain, indicating a much smaller correlation 
of switching to manual occupations and the individual skill levels. This is consistent with 
Figure 1.6 (b) due to lack of incentive for switching to manual among low-skilled routine 
workers. Similarly, columns 3 and 4 provide the empirical results from the model with the 
regressor as the ability quintiles. And coefficients across columns are all statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level. 
The individual switching patterns shown in Germany are also consistent with the 
theoretical prediction in Figure 1.1 (c) and the employment changes in the German labor 
market shown in Figure 1.3. 
1.6.3 Wage Effect of Occupation Changers 
In section 1.2, the theoretical prediction on worker’s occupational mobility implies that 
those switching out of routine occupations would earn higher wage incomes than if they 
would otherwise stay. In Figure 1.1 (b), as an example, workers between 𝑧2 and 𝑧2
′  would 
have higher log wages if they switch to the cognitive line rather than the dashed routine 
line. The same conclusion can be reached for workers between 𝑧1 and 𝑧1
′  in Figure 1.1 (b), 
and between  𝑧2 and 𝑧2
"  in Figure 1.1 (c). This section provides empirical evidence on the 
wage growth of switchers out of routine occupations relative to those staying.  
I run a series of models on the subsample containing only routine occupation 
workers before the switching occurs. And I follow their future wages for both switchers and 
stayers. The dependent variables are the log wage changes in the future years compared 
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to the year of switch, and the independent variables are the binary variables indicating the 
direction of the worker’s occupational switch. Tables 1.8 and 1.9 present the regression 
results for these models for Britain and Germany, respectively. 
[Insert Table 1.8] 
If the worker switches out of routine occupations in year 𝑡, then the wages in future 
years are tracked every year for seven years after the switch, namely from 𝑡 + 1 to 𝑡 + 7 
in this study. The regressors are the indicators for the directions of the occupational switch. 
And “to cognitive” is a binary variable that equals one if the worker switches to cognitive 
occupations in year 𝑡; “to manual” is a binary variable for switching to manual occupations. 
The omitted group is the workers who stay in routine occupations. Therefore, each of the 
coefficients in the tables indicates a difference-in-difference of the wage growth for 
occupation switchers between year 𝑡 and the future years, relative to the wage growth of 
the stayers between year 𝑡 and the future years. 
[Insert Table 1.9] 
Table 1.8 shows the results for Britain. The first row presents those who switch to 
cognitive immediately and shows that they enjoy a 2.6% faster wage growth one year after 
the switch, compared to the workers who choose to stay in routine occupations. The gap 
between these two groups gets larger each year thereafter, and reaches 7.5% in the 7th 
year. Workers who switch to manual occupations, presented in the second row, also show 
a similar relative wage growth. Therefore, the occupation switchers in both directions, 
whether to the higher-paid occupations or to the lower-paid occupations, enjoy a faster 
wage growth. 
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Empirical results relating to the relative wage growth for occupation switchers in 
Britain are consistent with the theory’s prediction given in Figure 1.1 (b). And the results 
are also consistent with the relative growth of wage premia shown in section 1.5.1.1, where 
regression results show increasing occupation by year fixed effects for both cognitive and 
manual workers relative to those in routine. 
Table 1.9 presents the results of the regression for Germany, where the first row 
shows a similar pattern of relative wage growth for those switching to cognitive 
occupations as we see in Britain, despite the relatively smaller magnitudes. Their wages 
grow 1.3% faster than those for stayers in the first year, and keep growing to around 8.5% 
by the 7th year on the horizon. However, coefficients from the second row show no 
significant difference for the wage growth of switchers to manual occupations. This can be 
explained by two possibilities. One is due to the relatively smaller sample of individuals 
who are switching to manual that results in a non-accurate identification. Another one is 
due to the relatively stable wage premia shown in section 1.5.1.2, where, unlike in Britain, 
German manual workers do not experience a faster wage growth than routine workers. 
Both reasons match to my previous findings about Germany: relatively stable wage premia 
and weak incentive for switching to manual. 
Thus, results shown in Table 1.9 for occupation switchers in Germany are also 
consistent with the theory’s prediction in Figure 1.1 (c) and the relative wage premia 
changes in Germany shown in section 1.5.1.2. 
1.6.3.1 Wage Effect of Occupation Changers Who Stay in Destination Occupations 
The samples of occupation switchers in the previous section include all individuals who 
switch out of routine occupations in year 𝑡, despite their career paths after the switch. 
However, there are some workers in the samples who switch back to their original 
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occupations after the first switch, or switch to the other non-routine occupations. Such 
presence of these observations would affect the regression results for relative wage 
growth of occupation switchers. In this section, I use the subsamples in each country that 
exclude those individuals and only keep those who switch out of routine occupations and 
stay in the destination occupations. The empirical results are presented in Tables 1.10 
and 1.11 for Britain and Germany, respectively. 
[Insert Table 1.10] 
[Insert Table 1.11] 
Both Tables show similar significant coefficients as Tables 1.8 and 1.9 but with 
even larger magnitudes for almost every single year after the occupational switching has 
occurred. For instance, the coefficient in row 1 for year 𝑡 + 3 is about 5% in Table 1.8. 
With the refined sample in Table 1.10, the wage growth for occupation switchers to 
cognitive and who stay is now 7.7% higher than for the non-switchers. And seven years 
after the switch, for workers who stay in the destination occupations of cognitive have a 
14.5% faster wage growth in Table 1.10, relative to the 8.5% in Table 1.8. Similar 
comparisons are also present for switching to manual occupations in Britain and for 
switching to cognitive in Germany, which strengthen my findings made in the previous 
section. Switching to manual occupations in Germany, as shown in the second row of 
Table 1.11, still shows no effect for the similar reasons from the discussion in the last 
section. 
1.6.4 Discussion Regarding the Different Patterns Between Britain and Germany 
Evidence presented above links the British labor market polarization to the theoretical 
prediction shown in Figure 1.1 (b), and links the German labor market polarization to the 
prediction shown in Figure 1.1 (c). That is, in Britain, the effect of RBTC benefits both non-
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routine cognitive workers and non-routine manual workers, at the expense of routine 
workers. On the other hand, RBTC in Germany increases the demand and wage premium 
for cognitive workers without putting any negative effect on the routine and manual 
workers. Why does Germany show a different pattern? Potential explanations include the 
unique education system and the strong labor market institutions in Germany. 
About 74% of the German labor force comes from either the dual system or full-
time vocational schools (Eichhorst, Rodríguez-planas, Schmidl, & Zimmermann, 2015), 
which offer occupation-specific degrees achieved through apprenticeship. And a majority 
of the graduates from these programs work in the routine occupations. This better 
prepares the young workers for their positions and ensures the labor force a higher overall 
skill level compared with their counterpart group in Britain. Therefore, the routine workers 
in Germany are more productive in their first jobs, which can result in a higher wage premia 
relative to Britain, and they are more adaptive to the new computerization era, which 
absorbs the negative impact from RBTC more efficiently. Additionally, the higher 
proportion of occupation-trained human capital and the requirement of degrees can also 
set barriers among occupations that prevent workers from switching, especially for non-
abstract occupations.  
The other major difference between these two countries is that Germany has one 
of the strongest labor market institutions among the major developed countries (Freeman, 
2007). Strong labor market institutions can provide strong on-the-job security. Such 
institutions also can shift the wage distribution upward, and eventually absorb a larger 
share of the profit. Germany has stronger employment protection legislations and a higher 
proportion of unionized labor force than Britain. Freeman and Medoff (1984) point out that 
unions have two faces in the labor market: one is the monopoly face and the other one is 
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the collective voice. The monopoly face raises workers’ wages, especially for the lower 
skilled workers (Card, 1996; Wang, 2017). Given that unions mainly cover the workers in 
the manufacturing and construction jobs, etc., they mainly are routine workers, those low-
skilled ones in these sectors would earn relatively higher wages. Therefore, the low-skilled 
routine workers have little incentive to switch to manual occupations. The collective voice 
face of unions bridges the employees with their employers and that helps the workers 
reduce turnover rate and improves the return on investments. And when poor 
management occurs, unlike with British workers who are more likely to quit and choose 
different employers, unions in Germany tend to cooperate with the employers and help to 
improve the management at the work place, which reduces the rate of quitting. As a result, 
this also reduces the incentive of downgrading to non-routine manual occupations for 
German routine workers. 
 
1.7 Summary 
Recent research shows that the employment share of mid-wage occupations decreased 
in many industrialized countries during the last several decades, while employment in both 
higher- and lower-paid occupations expanded significantly. Meanwhile, the wage growth 
of workers in the middle sector also has declined relative to higher- and lower-paid 
occupations. This pattern of labor market polarization cannot be explained by the 
hypothesis of Skill-Biased Technical Change (SBTC) but better fits the depiction of Autor, 
Levy, and Murnane (2003) of routine-biased technical change (RBTC). However, in 
investigating this depiction of labor market dynamics, prior studies have mainly focused 
on aggregated patterns of employment and wages due to data limitations.   
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Theories developed by Gibbons, Katz, Lemieux, et al. (2005), and Jung and 
Mercenier (2014) suggest that individual-level occupational selection is related to workers’ 
underlying comparative advantage based on observable and unobservable skills at the 
equilibrium of a competitive labor market. Based on predictions of sorting based on this 
self-selection theory, Cortes (2016) studies U.S. occupational mobility related to labor 
market polarization using PSID data. This research provides a comparative study in other 
industrialized countries including Britain and Germany, making use of detailed longitudinal 
individual-level data from household surveys conducted from 1999 to 2008.  
Despite the similarity between these two developed European countries, important 
institutional differences between Britain and Germany make this particular cross-national 
comparison especially interesting. Unlike the British system, in which general education 
plays an important role in the preparation of workers for their careers, Germany has one 
of the world’s most successful vocational education systems which aims at developing 
specific human capital. And unlike Britain, which relies to a greater extent on market 
forces, Germany relies on unions and collective bargaining to set wages and protect 
employment and workers in the face of reduced demand. The results of the study suggest 
that these different institutions result in different patterns of labor market dynamics in the 
context of RBTC.   
The analysis shows that in Britain, the wage premia of routine occupations decline 
relative to both the higher- and lower-paid occupations. This pushes the higher ability 
workers in routine occupations upward to cognitive occupations and encourages the lower 
ability workers to downgrade to the manual occupations. This pattern of mobility among 
routine workers according to the proxies used to measure their unobserved skill levels 
results in a decreasing employment share for routine occupations and increasing 
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employment shares in both cognitive and manual occupations. In Germany, the wage 
premia of cognitive occupations increase relative to routine occupations. This attracts 
workers with higher proxy measures of unobserved ability among workers in routine 
occupations to change to cognitive occupations. On the other hand, manual occupations 
in Germany do not show higher wage growth than routine jobs and thus attract few routine 
workers. This results in a one-direction occupational flow from routine to cognitive 
occupations. The combination of more specific development of human capital and 
stronger worker protections for workers in Germany appears to be associated with the 
relatively desirable outcome that routine workers principally tend to move up to higher paid 
occupations. 
In both countries, higher-ability workers from routine occupations tend to switch to 
higher-paid non-routine cognitive occupations and benefit from those switches through 
higher wage growth. Among routine workers in Britain, downgrading to non-routine manual 
occupations is more likely to occur at the lower tail of the distribution of the proxy measures 
of unobserved ability, yet it still induces higher wage growth. In Germany, there are few 
workers in routine occupations who switch to the relatively lower-paid manual occupations 
and there is also no consistent evidence of wage growth in the manual occupations among 
the few who do switch to that sector. 
While the evidence related to declining employment shares among routine workers 
and the ordering of wages in both Britain and Germany support the theoretical framing of 
the analysis, and differences in employment dynamics across the two countries are likely 
to be driven by large institutional differences in their educational systems and employment 
protections, this analysis does not contain a direct investigation of the contributions of 
those factors to the differential patterns observed.  Providing a more specific investigation 
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of the relative contributions and interactions of the different educational systems and 
extent of unionization to the patterns reported here for Britain and Germany will be the 
subject of future research.
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Table 1: Occupation Categories Based on 2000 Census Codes
Task Label Occupations 3-digit Census COC 2000
Non-routine Cognitive
Management, business and financial occupations 001-095
Professional and related occupations 100-354
Managers of retail and non-retail sales workers 470-471
Routine
Sales workers, except managers 472-496
Office and administrative support occupations 500-593
Construction and extraction occupations 620-694
Installation, maintenance and repair occupations 700-762
Production occupations 770-896
Transportation and material moving occupations 900-975
Non-routine Manual Service workers 360-465
Not Classified
Members of armed forces 984
Farming, fishing and forestry occupations 600-613
The grouping method of the occupations is based on the 3-digit US census COC 2000 codes which is also
the method used by Cortes (2016). The task labels are based on Acemoglu and Autor (2011) and the
groupings are based on Kambourov and Manovskii (2008). Because the CNEF pre-harmonizes the
occupation variables into ISCO-88 at the 4-digit level for both BHPS and SOEP, I map the occupations in
these data into the three groups making use of a crosswalk between the ISCO-88 and COC2000 codings
provided by the US National Crosswalk Service Center.
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Table 4: Wage Premia: Occupation-Year Fixed Effects (Britain)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
YEAR Cognitive Routine Cognitive Routine Cognitive Routine
Year 2 0.0282* 0.0110 0.0279* 0.0110 0.0282* 0.0125
(0.0147) (0.0143) (0.0147) (0.0143) (0.0147) (0.0143)
Year 3 0.00279 -0.0196 0.00161 -0.0207 0.00219 -0.0194
(0.0151) (0.0147) (0.0150) (0.0147) (0.0150) (0.0147)
Year 4 -0.000462 -0.0381** -0.00189 -0.0387** -0.00255 -0.0383**
(0.0161) (0.0158) (0.0161) (0.0158) (0.0161) (0.0158)
Year 5 0.0303* -0.0294* 0.0275* -0.0302* 0.0275* -0.0292*
(0.0165) (0.0162) (0.0165) (0.0162) (0.0164) (0.0162)
Year 6 0.0111 -0.0530*** 0.00804 -0.0543*** 0.00744 -0.0544***
(0.0167) (0.0165) (0.0167) (0.0165) (0.0167) (0.0165)
Year 7 0.0193 -0.0503*** 0.0166 -0.0508*** 0.0165 -0.0504***
(0.0170) (0.0167) (0.0170) (0.0167) (0.0170) (0.0167)
Year 8 0.0202 -0.0512*** 0.0170 -0.0527*** 0.0168 -0.0523***
(0.0165) (0.0165) (0.0166) (0.0165) (0.0165) (0.0164)
Year 9 0.0355** -0.0493*** 0.0317* -0.0508*** 0.0316* -0.0502***
(0.0167) (0.0166) (0.0168) (0.0166) (0.0167) (0.0166)
Year 10 0.0420** -0.0505*** 0.0386** -0.0521*** 0.0379** -0.0518***
(0.0172) (0.0171) (0.0172) (0.0171) (0.0172) (0.0171)
Constant 7.701*** 7.701*** 7.728*** 7.728*** 7.717*** 7.717***
(0.718) (0.718) (0.718) (0.718) (0.717) (0.717)
Observations 37,129 37,129 36,999 36,999 36,999 36,999
R-squared 0.362 0.362 0.363 0.363 0.365 0.365
Number of pid occ 11,872 11,872 11,819 11,819 11,819 11,819
Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
Demographics Y Y Y Y Y Y
Human Capital Y Y Y Y
Industry Y Y
Standard errors in parentheses; Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The omitted group is the manual occupations. The omitted year is 1999, year 1. The coefficients shows the
changes in wage premia for each future year compared with the base year relative to the change analogue
of non-routine manual occupations. Model 1 has the least controls where Model 2 adds human capital
indicators and Model 3 includes industry dummies. The coefficients show strongly polarized labor market
in Britain: routine occupations experience a slower wage growth relative to the top- and bottom- paid
sectors, while cognitive occupations show a slightly faster wage growth rate than manual occupations.
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Table 5: Wage Premia: Occupation-Year Fixed Effects (Germany)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
YEAR Cognitive Routine Cognitive Routine Cognitive Routine
Year 2 -0.00138 -0.00536 -0.00525 -0.00514 -0.00499 -0.00471
(0.0136) (0.0132) (0.0137) (0.0132) (0.0137) (0.0132)
Year 3 -0.00281 -0.0218 -0.00664 -0.0215 -0.00628 -0.0210
(0.0139) (0.0134) (0.0139) (0.0134) (0.0139) (0.0134)
Year 4 0.0114 -0.00987 0.00694 -0.00980 0.00711 -0.00935
(0.0139) (0.0135) (0.0139) (0.0135) (0.0139) (0.0135)
Year 5 0.0180 -0.0212 0.0143 -0.0207 0.0144 -0.0205
(0.0141) (0.0137) (0.0141) (0.0137) (0.0141) (0.0137)
Year 6 0.0365*** -0.0188 0.0331** -0.0183 0.0333** -0.0179
(0.0142) (0.0138) (0.0142) (0.0138) (0.0142) (0.0138)
Year 7 0.0439*** -0.0160 0.0405*** -0.0152 0.0407*** -0.0147
(0.0145) (0.0141) (0.0145) (0.0141) (0.0145) (0.0141)
Year 8 0.0451*** -0.0190 0.0417*** -0.0179 0.0420*** -0.0173
(0.0147) (0.0143) (0.0147) (0.0143) (0.0147) (0.0143)
Year 9 0.0528*** -0.0159 0.0499*** -0.0145 0.0503*** -0.0138
(0.0150) (0.0146) (0.0150) (0.0146) (0.0150) (0.0146)
Year 10 0.0659*** -0.0211 0.0631*** -0.0194 0.0634*** -0.0186
(0.0153) (0.0150) (0.0154) (0.0150) (0.0154) (0.0150)
Constant 8.554*** 8.554*** 8.596*** 8.596*** 8.588*** 8.588***
(0.0672) (0.0672) (0.0682) (0.0682) (0.0682) (0.0682)
Observations 55,897 55,897 55,861 55,861 55,861 55,861
R-squared 0.137 0.137 0.138 0.138 0.139 0.139
Number of pid occ 13,548 13,548 13,540 13,540 13,540 13,540
Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
Demographics Y Y Y Y Y Y
Human Capital Y Y Y Y
Industry Y Y
Standard errors in parentheses; Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The omitted group is the manual occupations. The omitted year is 1999, year 1. The coefficients shows the
changes in wage premia for each future year compared with the base year relative to the change analogue
of non-routine manual occupations. Model 1 has the least controls where Model 2 adds human capital
indicators and Model 3 includes industry dummies. Coefficients show relative faster wage growth in
non-routine cognitive occupations than routine and manual, where the latter two have similar wage growth
rates.
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Table 6: Probability of Switching to Non-routine Occupations (Britain)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES To N-R Cognitive To N-R Manual To N-R Cognitive To N-R Manual
Individual-Occupation FE 0.0617*** -0.0153***
(0.00531) (0.00263)
Individual-Occupation FE (Quintile) 0.0465*** -0.00921***
(0.00378) (0.00187)
Constant 0.219*** 0.0375*** 0.0655*** 0.0685***
(0.00559) (0.00277) (0.0126) (0.00625)
Observations 5,314 5,314 5,314 5,314
R-squared 0.025 0.006 0.028 0.005
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The regressors in the first two columns are the estimates of individual by occupation fixed effects. The
regressors in the last two columns are the quintiles of the individual by occupation fixed effects.
Table 7: Probability of Switching to Non-routine Occupations (Germany)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES To N-R Cognitive To N-R Manual To N-R Cognitive To N-R Manual
Individual-Occupation FE 0.0573*** -0.00615***
(0.00438) (0.00227)
Individual-Occupation FE (Quintile) 0.0390*** -0.00510***
(0.00311) (0.00161)
Constant 0.142*** 0.0271*** 0.0100 0.0439***
(0.00478) (0.00247) (0.0102) (0.00525)
Observations 5,002 5,002 5,002 5,002
R-squared 0.033 0.001 0.031 0.002
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The regressors in the first two columns are the estimates of individual by occupation fixed effects. The
regressors in the last two columns are the quintiles of the individual by occupation fixed effects.
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Table 8: Changes in Log Wages over Different Time Horizons for Switchers from Routine
Occupations (Britain)
A. Britain
t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7
To Cognitive 0.0262*** 0.0466*** 0.0488*** 0.0630*** 0.0813*** 0.0820*** 0.0746***
(0.00721) (0.00895) (0.0111) (0.0130) (0.0151) (0.0188) (0.0226)
To Manual 0.0472*** 0.0585*** 0.0706*** 0.0374 0.0664* 0.0601 0.0981**
(0.0164) (0.0209) (0.0256) (0.0311) (0.0356) (0.0424) (0.0486)
Constant 0.0717*** 0.128*** 0.166*** 0.206*** 0.249*** 0.287*** 0.327***
(0.00479) (0.00650) (0.00838) (0.00950) (0.0101) (0.0117) (0.0134)
Observations 10,958 8,427 6,454 5,141 3,975 2,943 2,050
R-squared 0.005 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.009 0.008 0.008
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Row one shows the effects on the future wage growth of the occupational switching to cognitive
occupations. Row two shows the effects of the switching to manual occupations. The omitted group are
the workers who stay in routine occupations at year t. In Britain, switchers towards both non-routine
occupations enjoy a faster wage growth after the occupational switchings.
Table 9: Changes in Log Wages over Different Time Horizons for Switchers from Routine
Occupations (Germany)
B. Germany
t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7
To Cognitive 0.0133* 0.0281*** 0.0383*** 0.0445*** 0.0467*** 0.0440*** 0.0852***
(0.00732) (0.00847) (0.0104) (0.0115) (0.0127) (0.0163) (0.0182)
To Manual 0.0178 0.0112 0.00993 -0.00634 -0.0118 -0.0430 -0.0264
(0.0162) (0.0186) (0.0209) (0.0231) (0.0256) (0.0330) (0.0380)
Constant 0.0286*** 0.0595*** 0.105*** 0.109*** 0.125*** 0.132*** 0.149***
(0.00341) (0.00403) (0.00448) (0.00496) (0.00543) (0.00601) (0.00641)
Observations 22,671 17,951 14,270 11,316 8,783 6,590 4,654
R-squared 0.003 0.009 0.016 0.012 0.010 0.005 0.005
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Row one shows the effects on the future wage growth of the occupational switching to cognitive
occupations. Row two shows the effects of the switching to manual occupations. The omitted group are
the workers who stay in routine occupations at year t. In Germany, only switchers towards cognitive
occupations enjoy a faster wage growth after the occupational switchings.
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Table 10: Changes in Log Wages over Different Time Horizons for Switchers from Routine
Occupations (Britain)
A. Britain
t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7
To Cognitive 0.0263*** 0.0560*** 0.0771*** 0.0975*** 0.137*** 0.151*** 0.145***
(0.00714) (0.0104) (0.0127) (0.0160) (0.0184) (0.0240) (0.0292)
To Manual 0.0472*** 0.0878*** 0.108*** 0.0890** 0.0836** 0.0885* 0.134**
(0.0161) (0.0242) (0.0309) (0.0390) (0.0414) (0.0512) (0.0609)
Constant 0.0666*** 0.114*** 0.162*** 0.191*** 0.221*** 0.259*** 0.297***
(0.00524) (0.00739) (0.00941) (0.0111) (0.0116) (0.0137) (0.0164)
Observations 8,769 6,551 4,892 3,779 2,857 2,049 1,373
R-squared 0.005 0.009 0.012 0.012 0.021 0.022 0.021
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The samples for the regressions in this table only keep those who switch out of routine occupations and
stay in the destination occupations. Coefficients in this table show similar but higher magnitudes compared
with the coefficients from the samples including workers switching back to routine occupations after year t.
Table 11: Changes in Log Wages over Different Time Horizons for Switchers from Routine
Occupations (Germany)
B. Germany
t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7
To Cognitive 0.0146** 0.0276*** 0.0363*** 0.0490*** 0.0711*** 0.0708*** 0.128***
(0.00733) (0.00853) (0.0115) (0.0138) (0.0155) (0.0193) (0.0220)
To Manual 0.0191 0.00875 -0.00821 -0.0313 -0.0603* -0.0545 -0.00249
(0.0162) (0.0188) (0.0241) (0.0301) (0.0336) (0.0403) (0.0522)
Constant 0.0288*** 0.0557*** 0.100*** 0.102*** 0.117*** 0.122*** 0.139***
(0.00361) (0.00427) (0.00477) (0.00531) (0.00581) (0.00637) (0.00686)
Observations 19,688 15,485 12,034 9,435 7,292 5,415 3,817
R-squared 0.003 0.008 0.014 0.011 0.012 0.007 0.009
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The samples for the regressions in this table only keep those who switch out of routine occupations and
stay in the destination occupations. Coefficients in the first row show similar but higher magnitudes
compared with the coefficients from bigger samples. Coefficients in the second row are still not statistically
significant.
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Figure 1: Occupational Sorting and Mobility Regarding The Worker’s Ability
(a)
(b)
(c)
The horizontal axis is the distribution of worker’s ability z. The vertical axis is the log wage. Each line represents
the potential log wage income for the worker with skill level z.
(a). At the initial equilibrium, workers are sorted into one of the three occupations based on their comparative
advantages. (b). The wage premium of routine occupation decrease while other occupations stay relatively stable.
The higher ability workers in routine switch to cognitive occupation. The lower ability workers switch to manual
occupation. (c). The wage premium of cognitive occupation increase while other occupations stay relatively stable.
The higher ability workers in routine switch to cognitive occupation. But the lower ability workers do not switch.
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Figure 2: Changes Of Employment Shares For The Three Occupational Categories in Britain
(a)
(b)
(a). In Britain, the employment of the routine occupations has declined by 9.26% from 1999 to 2008. Cognitive
increases by 5.06% and manual increases by 4.1%.
(b). The evolution of the employment shares in the 3 occupational categories for each year from 1999 through 2008
in Britain.
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Figure 3: Changes Of Employment Shares For The Three Occupational Categories in Germany
(a)
(b)
(a). In Germany, the decrease of the share of employment in the routine occupational category is almost entirely
offset by the increase in the share of employment in the cognitive occupational category.
(b). While the share of employment in routine occupations decreases over the ten year period, the share of cognitive
occupations increases with the similar rate. The share of manual occupations remains relatively stable.
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Figure 4: Occupational Wage trends
(a) Britain
(b) Germany
Average labor earnings of the workers in these three categories in each year. Both countries show that wages of the
cognitive occupational category are the highest, the routine occupations are in the middle and the manual
occupations have the lowest average pay. And all occupations in both countries exhibit increasing average labor
earning trends through the period of study.
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Figure 5: Wage Premia
(a) Britain
(b) Germany
The blue solid lines plot the estimated θˆCt for cognitive occupations and the red dashed lines plot the estimated θˆRt
for routine occupations. The omitted group is manual an is set to be zero.
(a). In Britain, wage premia of routine occupations decline relative to manual and cognitive occupations. Wage
premia of cognitive occupations increase relative manual occupations.
(b). In Germany, wage premia of routine occupations do not decline significantly. However, cognitive occupations
have a faster wage premia growth relative to routine and manual.
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Figure 6: Occupational mobility on skill levels
(a)
(b)
(a). In Britain, among routine occupations workers, switching to non-routine cognitive occupations is more likely to
occur at the higher end of the ability distribution. And switching to non-routine manual occupations is more likely
to occur at the lower end of the ability distribution.
(b). Switching to cognitive occupations is also more likely to occur among the higher ability workers in Germany.
And the high ability workers show no incentive to downgrade to manual. However, workers in the first quintile do no
show much higher incentive to switch to manual, relative to workers in the middle quintile.
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Chapter Two 
Who You Are and Where You Work 
A Cross-national Comparison of the Probability of Involuntary Job Loss 
Xiupeng Wang 
Abstract 
This paper takes advantage of detailed micro-level panel data from four countries-- Britain, 
Germany, Korea and Switzerland--to construct an index of worker’s unobservable ability 
by estimating the workers’ individual fixed effects. I find that in all four countries, 
conditional on industry and a vector of traditional observable human capital indicators, 
lower ability workers are consistently more likely to experience involuntary job loss. This 
relationship is more pronounced when the workers’ unobservable abilities are measured 
by time invariant individual fixed effects. In addition, I find unionization at the work place 
plays an important role in this mechanism. In Britain, Korea and Switzerland the union 
sector contributes almost all the effect while in Germany lower skilled workers in both 
unionized and non-unionized sectors are disproportionally more likely to lose jobs. 
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2.1 Introduction 
Why do some workers lose their jobs? An extant literature answers this question by 
tracking down the factors from the demand and supply side. On the demand side, a series 
of papers study whether involuntary job losses are concentrated in any particular 
industries, occupations, or regions (Carrington 1993; Dunne and Roberts 1990); on the 
supply side, other studies examine how heterogeneous characteristics among workers 
relate to the different probabilities of involuntary job loss, for instance, education, job 
training (Mincer 1991), gender (Abraham and Shimer 2001), race (Couch and Fairlie 
2010), etc. In addition to the above reasons, a large dimension of unobservable abilities 
(unobservable to researchers but observable to their employers) including strength, 
intelligence, agility, dexterity, visual acuity, creativity, and so on can also play important 
roles in influencing the probability of involuntary job separation (Willis 1986). Ross and 
Couch (2016) discover that the unobserved heterogeneity plays a large role in 
displacement where lower skilled workers are more likely to lose jobs. Furthermore, the 
institutions adopted by an economy interact with the labor market in many ways that 
influence both sides of the labor market and influence patterns of job loss.  
This paper explores the linkage between unobservable abilities and job security 
using household level longitudinal data from four countries: Britain, Germany, Korea and 
Switzerland. The advantage of using panel data is that it enables me to estimate an 
individual fixed effect and use it as the proxy of each worker’s unobservable ability level. 
More importantly, the multi-country comparative framework provides advantages in 
examining how labor market institutions, especially unionism, alter the patterns of 
involuntary job loss due to unobservable abilities. And the results show that, in general, 
lower ability workers, conditional on demographic characteristics, industry, occupation and 
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other human capital indicators, face higher probabilities of involuntary job separation. 
However, this pattern is pronounced across all the countries examined for unionized 
workers while non-unionized workers in three of the four countries do not follow this 
pattern. The one exception is Germany that has pattern wage bargaining that extends to 
many non-union workers. Thus, the pattern of results appears to be related to the 
compressed wage distribution among union workers that raises wages for lower ability 
workers to a level potentially above their marginal products. 
When the demand for labor falls, employers reduce the use of labor as an input. 
Then the question for the employer is among all the employees with different levels of 
ability that are associated with their wage levels, who should be laid off during an economic 
downturn. However, in the real world, workers may not get paid or lose jobs purely based 
on their abilities. Other factors may influence wage determination and employment. Labor 
market institutions can distort the competitive benchmark of a labor market equilibrium to 
raise the pay of less skilled workers thereby compressing the wage distribution. This may 
induce firms to invest in the general human capital of some of their employees (Acemoglu 
and Pischke 1999). A compressed wage distribution might induce employer investment in 
general and specific skills because higher ability workers, if paid less than their value 
marginal product, would bring extra profits to their employers (Oi 1962; Mincer 1991). 
Research (Oyer and Schaefer 2011) also shows that high skilled positions take a longer 
time for employers to fill and therefore increases the hiring cost for firms. This implies that 
workers with different skill levels may face different probabilities of job separation.  
On the other hand, labor market institutions may hurt firms who pay workers higher 
wages. Generally, labor market institutions may prevent employers from cutting wages 
during an economic downturn and labor contracts may even raise them. This implicitly 
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implies a higher probability of plant closing or mass layoff for higher wage firms 
(Hamermesh 1989). Additionally, Schmieder and von Wachter (2010) show that workers 
who are hired during good labor market conditions are paid more. Later, the wage rigidity 
that prevents wages from declining when the economy worsens would potentially lead to 
layoffs for the higher paid workers. In this paper, the results show that lower ability workers 
in general are more likely to lose their jobs when demand goes down.  
Labor market institutions, such as the extent of unionization, play an important role 
in shaping the wage structure (Acemoglu and Pischke 1999). This role can vary across 
countries according to the country’s specific political environment and labor laws. A cross-
national comparison using data from multiple countries varying in institutions can provide 
additional insight into understanding influences on involuntary job loss. Labor market 
institutions in advanced economies are often seen as important explanatory factors for 
divergent economic performances of different countries (Freeman 2007). Further, 
unionism may alter job separation patterns by interacting with both the wage determination 
and the job termination processes. This paper compares involuntary job losses that occur 
in both the unionized and non-unionized sectors in four countries and finds that, in Britain, 
Korea and Switzerland, low skilled workers in unionized sectors are more likely to lose 
their jobs compared with higher skilled workers while this pattern is absent for workers in 
non-unionized jobs. In Germany, however, lower skilled workers in both unionized and 
non-unionized sectors show a disproportionally higher probability of losing jobs than high 
skilled workers. This is likely due to the high degree of unionization in Germany and pattern 
wage bargaining that extends beyond the union sector influencing wages throughout the 
labor force regardless of formal union membership. 
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the recent 
literature in the areas of job loss, measurement of ability and labor market institutions. 
Section 2.3 describes the empirical model used to test the relationship between 
unobserved ability level and the probability of job loss while Section 2.4 details the data 
for each country and variable construction. Section 2.5 presents the empirical results of 
the analysis. Section 2.6 concludes. 
 
2.2 Literature Review 
This paper studies the relationship between unobserved worker skill and involuntary job 
loss and also examines the influence of unionization across countries on that relationship.  
Previous literature has reported negative effects on the workers and their families who are 
forced to leave their jobs because of the sudden detachment from the labor market (Farber 
2005). Many papers discuss what attributes of the workers and what factors of the 
industries would lead such job displacement to occur. However, a large number of 
dimensions of worker’s abilities have not been fully studied due to limitations of the data 
and their effect on the job displacement cannot be ignored. By obtaining proxies for 
unobserved individual ability based on fixed effects using panel data, this paper tries to 
assess the influence of unobserved ability on involuntary job loss. Additionally, labor 
market institutions also play an important role in protecting workers from losing their jobs. 
By examining the data from four advanced countries, this paper is able to explore how 
labor market institutions, particularly unionization, affect lay off decisions in different 
countries.  
Involuntary job loss due to mass layoff or plant closure has a long and persistent 
impact on workers’ labor earnings who are separated from their previous employers 
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(Hamermesh 1989; Fallick 1996). Research on this topic has been carried out with multiple 
data sources in several advanced countries. The literature shows consistent evidence of 
earning losses for displaced workers during unemployed spells that is sustained through 
subsequent spells of re-employment compared with those who are continuously 
employed.  
The proportion of earnings lost varies due to a variety of the factors in the studies, 
including the time period, the country, the data source, etc. In the U.S., earlier studies use 
the Displaced Worker Survey, which is a supplement to the Current Population Survey, 
and report earnings losses of 8 to 12 percent (Farber 1993, 1997; Neal 1995). Panel data 
is also commonly used. For instance, Stevens (1997) studies longitudinal data from Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics and report earnings losses of approximately 25 percent the 
year of displacement that remains 9 percent lower than expected levels 6 or more years 
later. Jacobson, Lalonde, and Sullivan (1993) were first to use administrative data to 
investigate earning losses following mass layoff. They use the data from the state of 
Pennsylvania and report a more than 40 percent earning loss immediately after the job 
separation and 25 percent 6 years later; however, their well known study was conducted 
at the time of a sharp recession. Couch and Placzek (2010) similarly make use of 
administrative data from Connecticut in a more normal period of economic activity and find 
the earning losses of displaced workers were initially 32 percent and then declined to 12 
to 15 percent 6 years later.  Their results are more similar to the findings from other studies 
using survey data which suggests that the source of the data is not a primary factor driving 
differences in results across studies.  Studies have also shown that the overall effects 
from involuntary job loss are more severe for elderly workers who lose their jobs at later 
stages of career (Couch 1998; Couch, Jolly, and Placzek 2009).   
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Earning losses from job displacement have also been well studied in several other 
countries. British studies show that the losses in labor earning following job displacement 
vary from 18 percent to 35 percent (Arulampalam 2001; Hijzen, Wright, and Upward 2010). 
Displaced workers in Germany seem to experience much less severe economic 
consequences as reported by studies using the longitudinal SOEP survey (Burda and 
Mertens 2001; Couch 2001; Bender and von Wachter 2006). However, using 
administrative data for over three decades, Schmieder, von Wachter, and Heining (2018) 
report somewhat larger and more persistent earning losses. 
In addition to the sharp immediate reduction in earnings and sustained losses in 
earnings that are found in many studies, the sudden unexpected interruption of 
employment is also associated with other adverse social and health impacts. Displaced 
workers are more likely to experience divorce (Kofi and Stephens 2004; Eliason 2012), 
more likely to have physical health and mental health issues (Gallo et al. 2000; Black, 
Devereux, and Salvanes 2015), smoke more cigarettes (Falba et al. 2005), and have 
shorter lives (Sullivan and von Wachter 2009). Furthermore, parental experiences of job 
displacements also have negative impacts on children’s academic achievements (Rege, 
Telle, and Votruba 2011; Stevens and Schaller 2011).  
Therefore, studying the causes of job displacement and understanding what 
factors increase the odds of losing jobs has long been the focus of economists and policy 
makers. A variety of factors have been considered. Among them, the worker’s own skills 
and characteristics have attracted many scholars’ attentions.  Workers skills have 
generally been categorized into two major groups: cognitive skills  (Mincer 1991; Cairó 
and Cajner 2016; Delaney and Devereux 2017) and non-cognitive skills (Heckman and 
Kautz 2012; Castex and Kogan Dechter 2014; Deming 2017), sometimes also referred as 
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“soft skills”. Early papers primarily focused on observable indicators of these skills such 
as years of education, tenure with the employer, and other psychometric measures.  
 In combination, indicators such as those mentioned can only reflect a portion of 
the worker’s entire set of skills, which leaves other unmeasured dimensions of skills as 
“unobserved”.  However, the unobserved skills of a worker often are observable to the 
employer and therefore reflected in wages. Thus, in a typical equation relating wage rates 
to skills, the contribution of unobserved skills would be within the residual.  
Following this observation, some researchers have used measures constructed 
from the residual such as individual fixed effects in panel data models as an indicator for 
worker’s unobserved skills. Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) report that conditional 
on the observable indicators like education, occupation, and industry, unobserved 
individual fixed effects are the most important source of wage variation in France. They 
also report that firms that hire workers with higher unobserved skill are more productive.  
Abowd, McKinney, and Vilhuber (2009) construct the human capital that includes both the 
observable and unobservable components. The unobservable component of the human 
capital is estimated by the individual fixed-effect. They study the firms with different 
distributions of human capital and find the occurrence of displacement and plant closure 
are more likely in firms with higher proportions of their labor force with relatively low levels 
of human capital. A similar measurement method is also used in the recent literature 
regarding labor market dynamics and routine-biased technical change. For example, using 
PSID data and controlling for individual fixed effects, Cortes’ (2016) reports a strong 
correlation between occupational mobility patterns and the unobserved skill level among 
workers that primarily perform routine tasks. Wang (2017) follows a similar method using 
panel data from Britain and Germany and also finds a strong relationship between 
unobserved skills and changes in employment across occupations that make use of 
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different skills. Ross and Couch (2016)extend the method to the job displacement using 
the penal data of PSID from the U.S. and explore strong negative correlation between the 
worker’s unobservable ability and the probability of job displacement. 
This paper applies the same empirical methodology to the literature of job 
displacement and investigates how worker’s unobserved abilities influence the probability 
of job loss. Higher ability workers tend to receive higher wage payments as a reward for 
greater productivity controlling for job specific factors, the individual’s demographic 
characteristics, and their observable human capital. Additionally, highly paid workers may 
be particularly valuable to firms for several reasons: they work on important tasks in the 
firm; their human capital is embodied in a high proportion of firm-specific skills; and it is 
expensive to replace their positions in the labor market. Consequently, they are more likely 
to stay with a firm than lower ability workers. A theoretical framework provided by Oi (1962) 
explains that higher ability workers receive higher wages and are particularly attached to 
their firms because of the high costs of their employment and on-the-job training. Gibbons 
and Katz (1991) provide both theoretical and empirical evidence suggesting that as soon 
as the employers observe workers’ on-the-job productivity to be lower than a certain level, 
they lay off those workers (lemons). My research brings methods used to relate 
unobserved skills to employment changes to the literature on involuntary job loss by 
examining workers who are continuously employed by the same employers for at least 
three years and examining how residual measures of their skill level affects the probability 
of involuntary job loss. 
Furthermore, this paper compares job loss patterns across different countries with 
differing labor market institutions, especially their collective bargaining arrangements and 
extent of unionization. As unionization takes an important role in both the wage 
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determination and the job separation processes, this cross-national study provides useful 
information on how involuntary job losses and their relationship with unobserved abilities 
for workers in unionized sectors differ from those in nonunionized sectors. Freeman and 
Medoff (1984) surveyed a series studies on the union wage effect and indicated that, in 
addition to the fact that unionism in general raises the wages for all organized workers, 
this effect seems to be greater for lower skilled workers who would otherwise have been 
paid less elsewhere, than those for the higher skilled workers. The wage distribution for 
workers in unionized sectors is generally narrower than in nonunionized sectors. This 
implies the probability of displacement for lower ability workers in the unionized sector 
would be anticipated to be higher than for the lower ability workers in the nonunionized 
sector. However, Card (1996) points out that such narrowed wage distribution can induce 
stronger selection of more able workers into unionized jobs among those with low 
observed levels of skill. If the process of selection is strong enough, the involuntary job 
separation pattern in the unionized sector would not differ from that observed in the non-
unionized sector.  
Job separation in unionized sectors also usually follows seniority policies 
established through negotiation between the union representative and management 
(Freeman and Medoff 1984). But even without a representative union at the work place, 
workers with more tenure are in general better protected (Abraham and Medoff 1984) as 
they have more firm specific human capital. In addition, the unionized sectors often make 
use of temporary layoffs and recall workers as demand increases following a recession 
rather than permanently laying off workers in response to a downturn (Medoff 1979).  
Among the four countries studied in this paper, Germany has stronger statutory 
protections for workers (Freeman 2007). And collective negotiation between the 
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employers and the trade unions plays an important role in the labor market in setting 
wages and protecting workers (Schmieder, Von Wachter, and Bender 2016). Unions 
bargain at national and regional levels and the contract agreements are typically extended 
to the entire industry (Couch 2001). Moreover, worker representation in the business place 
is protected by law.  In public corporations that have a board of directors as well as in 
small firms, worker representatives are involved in operating decisions of the firms, 
including decisions about layoffs. As a result, high skilled workers in unionized sectors 
actively participate in unions and workers councils and have a stronger influence on layoffs 
than in other countries.  
Comparatively, the other three countries in this study show much less of a role for 
unionism. Especially in Britain, after the anti-unionization movement in the 1980s, union 
density in Britain fell from 55.8 per cent in 1979 to 29.4 per cent in 2001 (Waddington 
1992; Brook 2002). Based on British labor law, collective agreements between the 
employers and the unions are not legally binding on all workers. Workers in the firms with 
active unions have the right of opting out of the union shop and can avoid paying the fees.  
Korea has a long history of suppressing unionism activity by its government until 
the sudden relaxation following the country’s political democratization in 1987 (Fields and 
Yoo 2000). As the result, the union density in Korea experienced an expansion during the 
1980s. The union members among Korean labor force increased from 12.6% as in 1970 
to 17.6% in 1990. However, the union density has then started to decline to around 11% 
near the end of 1990s  and the early 2000s, which is the period this study covers (Visser 
2006). The rate of collective bargaining in Korea was about 12% as reported by Visser, 
Hayter, and Gammarano (2015). Korea is also among the countries with the least 
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government social spending with only 9.3 percent of its GDP, a number that is almost one 
fourth of Germany (OECD 2007). 
In Switzerland, the system of industrial relations had been relatively stable since 
the 1950s, until the trade unions had been confronted in the 1990s and started declining 
since then (Oesch 2010). Unions play a minor role in the Swiss labor market. The 
administrative data shows that about one fourth of the Swiss labor force were members 
of trade unions in early 2000s. Visser (2006)  suggests that the administrative membership 
data may be inaccurate and reports that the actual union coverage was about 13% in 
2001. However, the coverage of the collective bargaining in Switzerland was much higher 
which is mainly because the collective agreements are generally binding. Even after 
efforts from the employers’ associations of calling for less binding collective agreements 
in 1990s, the proportion of workers covered by the collective bargaining was still about 
40% in 2000 (OECD 2004). Therefore, the union membership status in the four countries 
studied could have different effect on the involuntary job loss. 
Involuntary job loss has a significant and persistent effect on workers and their 
families. However, it is still not yet clear who would be the ones, among workers with 
different ability levels while other factors are all equal, to let go when the employers need 
to reduce their workforce due to economic difficulty.  Additionally, does working in a 
unionized work place make the pattern different and if so, why? This paper makes the use 
of detailed longitudinal data to obtain estimates of a proxy of unobserved ability based on 
panel fixed effects models to study the worker’s probability of involuntary job loss. The 
study extends across four countries that differ in their labor market institutions.  
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2.3 Empirical Methodology 
The empirical strategy of estimating how the ability of unobserved workers affects the 
probability of involuntary unemployment proceeds in two steps. The first and necessary 
step is to identify and exclude the influences of all observable factors from the wage by 
estimating the hedonic wage model. What remains in the wage that cannot be extracted 
by the observed factors is the residual, which is positively correlated with the individual’s 
unobservable productive ability in the industry doing a specific job. I use two different types 
of models to estimate the unobservable ability. The first is to estimate the wage residual 
by treating the data as if it were pooled cross-sectionally. The second is to take the 
advantage of the panel data and estimate the individual fixed-effect. The latter one 
captures the time-invariant part across the same person and leaves the idiosyncratic part 
that varies with time in the residual, while the earlier strategy does not separate these two 
because of the design of the model. Using these two different proxies of the unobservable 
ability in the second step of estimating the displacement probability enables me to 
understand how much of the effect comes from the individual’s time-invariant 
unobservable ability. In both cases, I gradually add variables representing different 
characteristics such as demographics, observed skills and industry and occupation of 
employment.  The initial pooled cross-sectional wage model is given as follows: 
ln𝑊𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝑋𝑖𝛽𝑋 +𝐻𝑖𝛽𝐻 + 𝐽𝑖𝛽𝐽 + 𝑇𝑖𝛽𝑇 + 𝜖𝑖                                          [1] 
Where 𝑊𝑖 is the individual labor earnings of observation 𝑖; 𝑋𝑖 includes all individual 
demographic characteristics, including gender, age, citizenship, number of children and 
marriage status for that observation; 𝐻𝑖  is a vector of the worker’s human capital 
indicators, such as education achievement and job tenures; 𝐽𝑖 is a vector of demand-side 
features such as industry, occupation and industry-occupation controls; and 𝑇𝑖 is here a 
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vector of year dummies. The unexplained part of the wage equation is included in the 
residual 𝜖?̂?, which in the next step is treated as the index of individual unobservable ability 
on the right-hand side of a linear probability model: 
𝐷𝑖 = 𝑎 + 𝜖?̂?𝛿 + 𝑋𝑖𝑏𝑋 +𝐻𝑖𝑏𝐻 + 𝐽𝑖𝑏𝐽 + 𝑇𝑖𝑏𝑇 + 𝜇𝑖                                      [2] 
Where 𝐷𝑖 is a binary variable of job displacement that equals one if the worker 
experiences involuntary job loss eventually and zero if the worker is continuously 
employed; 𝑋𝑖 , 𝐻𝑖  and 𝐽𝑖  are still the supply-side demographic characteristics, human 
capital indicators, and demand-side job characteristics, respectively; and 𝛿  is the 
coefficient of interest that captures how the probability of involuntary job loss changes if 
the worker’s ability changes among the observations in the pooled cross-section data.  
Again, equation (2) is estimated including the different characteristics such as 
demographic, human capital, and industry-occupation of employment, which are added 
gradually to the estimation.  The purpose is to see if the influence of the residual declines 
as observed characteristics are added to the estimations. 
To further explore how the probability of involuntary job loss changes due to 
unobserved worker heterogeneity, I employ the individual fixed effect model with panel 
data and include variable 𝜆𝑖, which captures the individual fixed effect: 
ln𝑊𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜆𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖,𝑡𝛽𝑋 +𝐻𝑖,𝑡𝛽𝐻 + 𝐽𝑖𝛽𝐽 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                    [3] 
𝛾𝑡  is the time fixed effect and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  is i.i.t. with 𝐸(𝜀𝑖,𝑡) = 0 . Using the estimated 
individual fixed effect 𝜆?̂? as the estimator on the right-hand side in the linear probability 
model, the second step estimates how the time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity 
among workers affects the odds of job loss:  
𝐷𝑖 = 𝑎 + 𝜆?̂?𝜌 + 𝑋𝑖𝑏𝑋 +𝐻𝑖𝑏𝐻 + 𝐽𝑖𝑏𝐽 + 𝑇𝑖𝑏𝑇 + 𝜇𝑖                                     [4] 
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Where 𝜌  is the coefficient of interest that captures how the probability of 
involuntary job loss changes if the worker’s ability changes.  
 
2.4 Data Description 
This project uses longitudinal household level survey data from four countries: Britain, 
Germany, Korea and Switzerland. The data sources for the countries are the British 
Household Panel Study (BHPS), Germany’s Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), the Korea 
Labor Income Panel Study (KLIPS) and the Swiss Household Panel (SHP). I also use the 
Cross-National Equivalent File (CNEF), which harmonizes some variables commonly 
used in cross-national research following collection of the data.    Here, I briefly describe 
each survey. 
In 1991, the Institute for Social and Economic Research at Britain’s University of 
Essex launched the first wave of the BHPS, and since then it has continuously interviewed 
the same households. Their fieldwork typically starts during the September of each wave 
year and runs through the following Spring. About 5,500 households and 10,300 
individuals from 250 areas of Great Britain entered the first wave. Also in 1999, samples 
of 1,500 households in both Scotland and Wales were added to the main sample. 
Conducted for 18 waves, the survey ended in 2008, when many of the households joined 
the new, larger, and more wide-ranging “Understanding Society” survey.  
The German Institute for Economic Research, DIW Berlin, started the SOEP in 
1984. Nearly 11,000 households and about 30,000 persons have been sampled every 
year by the fieldwork organization TNS Infratest Sozialforschung. The fieldwork typically 
starts at the end of January and lasts for nine months. The most recent available wave 
was surveyed in 2014 (Wave 31). 
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KLIPS, the first Korean domestic longitudinal survey, interviews 5000 households 
about labor market issues and the income activities of households and individuals in urban 
Korea. The 1st Wave of the KLIPS was launched in 1998 by the KLI (Korea Labor 
Institute); the latest wave was 17 completed in 2014. The fieldwork season starts in the 
Spring and runs until later in the year.  
The Swiss Centre of Expertise in the Social Sciences FORS in Lausanne operates 
and hosts the SHP, which is a yearly panel study that over time follows a random sample 
of private households in Switzerland. Data collection for the first set of households, SHP_I, 
started in 1999 with a sample of 5,074 households that contained 12,931 household 
members. In 2004, a second sample—SHP_II—was recruited that consisted of 2,538 
households and 6,569 household members. Fieldwork had been conducted from 
September of each wave year through the end of the following Spring. Continuously 
updated each year, SHP data is currently available up to 2014 (Wave 16).  
The CNEF 1970-2013, prepared by Dean Lillard and currently housed in the 
Department of Human Sciences at the Ohio State University (previously at Cornell 
University), takes variables from each of the underlying surveys – BHPS, SOEP, KLIPS 
and SHP – and then codes them consistently across countries. The CNEF collection of 
harmonized variables is assembled in collaboration with the institutes that are responsible 
for the surveys themselves. My study examines variables such as years of education, 
individual labor earnings, occupations, and industries, which are recorded in the CNEF 
files. I also make use of the underlying variables of employment history from each survey 
that are necessary to identify the workers who experience involuntary job loss. These 
variables typically provide information about whether the worker lose her job during the 
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reference period. I also use the variables from each survey to construct the worker’s 
tenure. 
These panel data sets span the period 1999 to 2008, which is the period of overlap 
of the four studies. In each country’s data set, I identify two groups of workers. One group 
consists of people who from 1999 to 2008 were employed continuously with full-time jobs 
by the same employers and with positive labor earnings. The other group consists of 
workers who involuntarily lost their jobs because of mass layoffs or plant closures or 
because they were made redundant or were dismissed or sacked after at least 3 years of 
tenure with the same employer. In the second group the job displacements occurred 
between 2002 and 2008. My study’s main focus is workers who are active in local labor 
markets. Thus, for both groups I include only prime aged (25 to 55) workers.  
Table 2.1 reports the descriptive statistics for the combined groups in all four 
countries. My sample consists of 2648 individuals from the four countries, and it includes 
872 involuntary job losers. Among the ones who reported involuntary job losses, 442 are 
British, 207 are German, 177 are Korean, and 46 are Swiss. As shown in Table 2.1, the 
mean of individual labor earnings among future displaced workers is lower than the mean 
among continuous workers in all four samples. The units for earnings are British pounds, 
euros, 10,000 KRW (Korean Won), and Swiss Francs for the British, German, Korean, 
and Swiss data sets, respectively.  
Note that the KLIPS collected only post-tax earnings prior to 2003 while the other 
countries provided pre-tax earnings for all the years of observation. Therefore, I use the 
Korean Income Tax schedule from 1999 to 2008 to impute pre-tax incomes and I compare 
the imputed incomes after 2003 with the collected incomes during these years. Table 2.2 
reports the paired t-test, which does not reject the null hypothesis that the imputed 
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incomes equals the collected incomes in the period when both can be observed.   I use 
the same method to impute from the Korean Income Tax schedule pre-tax incomes before 
2003, and I use these imputed pre-tax incomes in the analysis. 
2.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Here I present the basic statistics of the longitudinal data from the four study countries. 
Table 2.1 provides detailed descriptive statistics about the samples, including each 
worker’s demographic characteristics, education background, occupation and job 
industry, and labor earnings from jobs. Germany provides the largest sample while 
Switzerland has the smallest. Britain has the most involuntarily displaced workers; 
Switzerland has the fewest.  
[Insert Table 2.1] 
My sample includes only prime-aged workers 25 to 55 years old and most are 
between 30 and 49 years old. Notice that in Britain, displacement is heavily concentrated 
among relatively older workers: about 45.2% of the displaced workers are above 50. This 
may suggest that in Britain senior workers are systematically laid off: none of the other 
countries show this pattern. Although there are more male workers displaced than female 
workers in absolute numbers, the proportion of female displaced workers among all 
women are seem to be higher than the proportion of male. And this is consistent among 
all four countries of study. The rate of involuntary job loss is relatively much higher among 
non-married workers than among people who have families. In all four countries job 
displacements largely happens in manufacturing sectors in 1-digit categories; workers in 
service sectors are less likely to lose their jobs. In Britain, Germany, and Korea craft 
workers are most likely to lose their jobs; in Switzerland clerical workers have the least job 
security. When we compare the annual labor earnings of workers who keep their jobs and 
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of those who lose jobs, we find in all four countries that displaced workers initially earn 
significantly less than workers who stay in their jobs.  
 
2.5 Empirical Findings 
This section presents the estimates of the wage equations estimated to obtain residualized 
measures of worker ability.  Then, estimates of the linear probability model relating worker 
ability and other worker characteristics to the probability of job loss are presented.  
2.5.1  Estimations of the Wage Equation 
I first show the results of wage estimations in Tables 2.2 through 2.5 for Britain, Germany, 
Korea, and Switzerland, respectively. In each table, the first four columns (1 to 4) report 
the estimates of the log wage using the pooled cross-sectional specification. The next two 
columns (5 and 6) report the estimates using the individual fixed effect model. In the British 
sample, 4732 observations are recorded for 709 individuals including those who were 
continuously employed during a 10-year period and those who were displaced at some 
point in years three to nine. The other sample sizes are as follows: in Germany, 10218 
observations for 1121 individuals; in the Korean sample, 4024 observations for 544 
individuals; and in the Swiss sample 2521, observations for 274 individuals. 
[Insert Table 2.2] 
[Insert Table 2.3] 
[Insert Table 2.4] 
[Insert Table 2.5] 
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In each table’s first column, I start with a relatively naïve model that includes only 
demographic characteristics. Then in each sequential column I add more attributes to the 
estimation of the wage equation; that is, I include human capital indicators in the second 
column, industry and occupation in the third column, and industry-occupation controls in 
the fourth. By adding more attributes to the estimation, the R-squared values increase 
monotonously in all countries. This reveals that in each sequential column more and more 
of the individual’s log wage is explained by the added variables; the unexplained variation 
of the log wage is left in the residual and becomes smaller across the first four columns in 
each country.  
The fifth and sixth columns use the individual fixed effect panel models to estimate 
the log wage equations. The individual fixed effects take a large proportion of explanatory 
power because the R-squared values are much larger than the values in the first four 
columns when pooled cross-section specifications are used. In other words, a large 
proportion of wage variation can be attributed to the unobservable individual 
heterogeneity. For the sake of simplicity, I only use two specifications in the individual 
fixed effect model: column five uses a relatively simple model to estimate log wages from 
individual demographic characteristics and human capital indicators, while column six 
adds industry, occupation, and industry-occupation controls.  
Several aspects of the wage estimation are worth noting. In all countries, women 
earn significantly less than men. The magnitude of the coefficient of the female dummy 
is exceptionally high in Korea (around -0.33); in Switzerland, it is the lowest (around -
0.19). Only in Korea do wages not increase with the worker’s age. As is the case in all 
countries, the tenure of the Korean worker at his or her current job account is a 
significant determinant of wages. Education is a very important indicator of human 
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capital: higher school achievement is related to higher wage earnings, while the effects 
of vocational education represented by the parameter estimates for the samples from 
different countries are ambiguous.  
2.5.2  Wage distribution and involuntary job loss 
In the previous section, the estimates of the log annual wage equation use two sets of 
specifications: pooled cross section and individual fixed effect regressions. To each set of 
specifications, I sequentially add attributes in groups. Columns 4 and 6 in the tables for 
the countries (Tables 2.2 to 2.5) include the full set of observable right-hand side variables.  
 [Insert Figure 2.1] 
In Figure 2.1, four graphs plot the estimated wage residual distributions using the 
cross-section specification shown in column 4 for each country. The results for Britain are 
shown in the upper left figure; those for Germany are shown in the upper right figure; those 
for Korea are shown in the lower left one; and those for Switzerland are shown in the lower 
right one. Red solid lines show the distributions of the wage residuals for displaced 
workers; blue dashed lines show the distributions of wage residuals for never-displaced 
workers. Figure 2.1 shows that in both Germany and Switzerland, displaced workers 
appear to be paid less than the never-displaced workers. In the British and Korean plots, 
it is difficult to determine whether displaced workers are paid less than those who are in 
the continuously working group. In any case, the former are more widely distributed.  
[Insert Figure 2.2] 
Figure 2.2 shows four graphs of the estimated individual fixed effects that are 
based on the wage estimation specified in column 6 of Tables 2.2 through 2.5 Again, the 
red solid lines indicate displaced workers. The individual fixed effect captures the worker’s 
unobserved productivity, which is time invariant and heterogeneous among workers. 
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Comparing the plots of displaced and continuously working people in Germany, Korea 
and Switzerland, we see that eventually displaced workers are less well paid conditional 
on observed characteristics, which indicates that they are less productive holding those 
factors constant. The British plot shows a wider distribution of the displaced workers. 
Although the difference of the mean between the displaced and non-displaced is not as 
obvious as other countries, displaced workers in general are paid slightly less than those 
are continuously employed. In the next section, I show the parameter estimates of the 
systematic displacement. 
2.5.3 Probability of involuntary job loss 
From each of the estimates of the log wage equation for each country, I take the predicted 
value of the residual along with the individual fixed effect from specifications (4) and (6) to 
use as a measure of unobserved productivity. The residuals and fixed effects are 
standardized first. And then I include those standardized residual measures or  individual 
fixed effects in a linear probability model along with the other observed characteristics to 
estimate their effects on job loss.  By using the linear probability model (LPM) to regress 
the odd of involuntary job loss on these observed and unobserved measures of 
unobserved productivity, estimates are obtained regarding how individual productivity 
affects the worker’s probability of losing their job. Tables 2.6 to 2.9 report the results of 
the second step estimations for Britain, Germany, Korea and Switzerland, respectively.  
In all of the tables, the first four columns use the estimated wage residuals from 
the first step’s pooled cross-section specifications, as reported in the first four columns. 
However, all four specifications in the second step use the same specification, which 
entails adding all the attributes in the estimation, such as demographic characteristics, 
human capital indicators, industry controls, occupation controls and industry-occupation 
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controls. Therefore, the tables here report the probability of involuntary job loss under 
different estimated individual ability indexes but using the same empirical strategy. As 
shown in all four tables, wage residuals provide strong predictions of job loss. From 
column 1 to column 4, such predictions are consistently negative and significant with a 
decreasing magnitude and variance in the coefficients. This demonstrates that when more 
and more variation is excluded from the wage residual—that is, the constructed individual 
ability index—the absolute correlation of the wage residual and the odd of involuntary job 
loss goes down. But even in specification (4) where all covariates were included in 
construction of the residual productivity measure, the coefficients on the residuals are still 
significantly negative. This result is robust across columns and across all four countries. 
 [Insert Table 2.6] 
[Insert Table 2.7] 
[Insert Table 2.8] 
[Insert Table 2.9] 
Comparing the magnitude in column 4 across the study countries (Tables 2.6 to 
2.9), as the regressor is standardized, we see that the coefficients can be interpreted: In 
response to a one standard deviation increase (decrease) in the residual wage 
distribution, British workers decrease (increase) their probability of losing their jobs by 1.64 
percent, German workers decrease (increase) their probability of job loss by 3.45 percent, 
Korean workers decrease (increase) their probability of job loss by 1.92 percent, and 
Swiss workers decrease (increase) their probability of job loss by 1.31 percent. These 
results show a significant difference in the correlation of the measures of unobserved ability and 
job loss; the German labor market is the most responsive to the change of workers’ abilities, 
while the Swiss labor market is the least responsive.  
 81 
 
 
Columns 5 and 6 in Tables 2.6 to Table 2.9 report the probability of involuntary job 
loss using the wage residuals and individual fixed effects from the wage specifications 
using panel data. Column 5 estimates the odds of involuntary job loss regressed on the 
wage residuals and individual fixed effects that come from the specification of column 5 in 
the first step. Column 6 estimates the odds of involuntary job loss regressed on the wage 
residuals and individual fixed effects that come from the specification of column 6 in the 
first step. Both second step estimations use the same specification and include all 
attributes in the equations.  
The coefficients related to the individual fixed effects are larger than those related 
to the wage residual shown in the first four columns. The coefficients in column 6 can be 
interpreted as indicating that a one standard deviation increase (decrease) in individual 
time-invariant ability would eventually result in the following changes in the probabilities of 
job loss in the study countries: a 3.28 percent decrease (increase) in Britain, a 5.52 percent 
decrease (increase) in Germany, a 9.18 percent decrease (increase) in Korea, and a 2.87 
decrease (increase) in Switzerland. Again, the Swiss labor market is the least responsive 
to changes in workers’ abilities. Korea, rather than Germany, has the most responsive 
labor market.  
When the estimated individual fixed effects are included on the right-hand side of 
the second step estimation, in all four countries the coefficient in the LPM for the wage 
residual becomes statistically insignificant and close to zero in magnitude. This suggests 
that the clearest indicator of involuntary job loss is the idiosyncratic difference between 
workers rather than variation within each worker across years. 
Britain, Germany, and Switzerland systematically protect aged workers from 
involuntary separation from their jobs: both British and German tables show a negative 
and significant correlation between age and job loss. In Korea, in contrast, there is a 
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significantly positive relation between age and job loss. Combined with the coefficient of 
age in the first step, as reported in table 2.4, seniority in Korea would not necessarily lead 
to an increase in wages (in contrast to the pattern observed in the other studied countries), 
but it would certainly lead to an increase in the probability of job loss. Senior workers in 
Korea are the least protected from involuntary job loss.  
In my empirical results, married workers in Britain, Korea and Switzerland are 
disproportionally less likely to lose their jobs. Being married reduces the probability of job 
loss by 10.6 percent in Britain (Table 2.6 column 6), by 11.9 percent in Korea (Table 2.8 
column 6), and by 7.4 percent in Switzerland (Table 2.9 column 6). Germany is the only 
exception that shows no statistical significance on job displacement by marriage. On the 
other hand, having children significantly increase the probability of job displacement in 
Britain, Germany and Korea. The probability of job displacement for parents are 5.3 
percent higher in Britain (Table 2.6 column 6), 2.5 percent higher in Germany (Table 2.7 
column 6), and 3.4 percent higher in Korea (Table 2.8 column 6). Having children does 
not affect the odd of losing jobs in Switzerland. 
2.5.4 Sensitivity analysis 
In the previous section, I constructed the unobservable ability indexes of individual 
workers by using different measures of predicted wage residuals. Here I use different 
second step specifications to check the sensitivity of the index. Tables 2.10 to 2.13 report 
the sensitivity analysis for the four study countries. In these tables (and in contrast to 
Tables 2.6 to 2.9), the first four columns use the wage residuals from specification 4 in the 
first step, while columns 5 and 6 use the wage residuals and individual fixed effects from 
specification 6.  
 [Insert Table 2.10] 
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[Insert Table 2.11] 
[Insert Table 2.12] 
[Insert Table 2.13] 
The first four columns report the results from the LPM models with controls added 
to the regression sequentially. But they all use the predicted wage residuals from the first 
step specification in column 4 which includes all observable attributes. This is intended to 
ensure that the observed characteristics can pick up more of the variation in the outcome.  
In Table 2.10 to Table 2.13, column 1 includes only the demographic characteristics; 
column 2 adds the human capital indicators; column 3 adds industry and occupation 
controls; and column 4 adds industry-occupation controls. In all four study countries, the 
coefficients related to the predicted wage residual do not vary much from column 1 to 4. 
From this I conclude that the relationship between the predicted wage residual and 
involuntary job loss is robust to this variation in estimation strategy.  
Columns 5 and 6 use the predicted individual fixed effects and residuals that come 
from the specification 6 for the wage equation to estimate the probability of job loss again 
varying the controls being used.  Column 5 includes demographic characteristics and 
human capital indicators and column 6 adds employer controls. With the exception of 
Germany, which shows robust results when these two specifications are compared, all of 
the countries exhibit different results across models 5 and 6. The British data show a non-
significant result when employer controls are absent but a statistically significantly and 
negative (with a large magnitude) coefficient when employer controls are included. 
Judging from the Korean and Swiss data, the specification that includes employer controls 
produces a coefficient that is more than twice as large as the coefficient that lacks 
employer controls. This result suggests that in Britain, Korea and Switzerland, variation in 
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unobserved ability conditional on industry and occupation of employment is important in 
predicting involuntary job loss.  
2.5.5 Unionization, involuntary job loss and ability 
One advantage of the cross-country information used in this study is that it can be used 
to examine how a particular mechanism related to labor market dynamics differs across 
countries that have different labor market institutions. In this section, I consider how in 
each of the study country’s unionization alters the relationship between a worker’s ability 
and involuntary job loss. 
Table 2.14 reports the relevant estimation results in the four study countries. Using 
only the wage residuals from the cross-section wage regression based on specification 4 
using all covariates, the table’s first three columns estimate involuntary job loss with the 
LPM specification 4 in the second step.  A variable reflecting unionization is included in 
the estimations in the first column while the next two separate the sample by union status. 
The next three columns estimate the involuntary job loss in the second step including the 
individual fixed effects and the wage residuals based on specification 6 from the wage 
regressions plus all other covariates. Again, a variable for union status is included in the 
model in column 4 while the sample is split by union status in columns 5 and 6.  
[Insert Table 2.14] 
As reported in Table 2.14 in columns 1 and 4, union status reduces the odds of 
being laid off in Britain, Korea and Switzerland, whereas in Germany unionized workers 
are more likely to be laid off than non-unionized workers. Comparing the coefficients of 
wage residuals in the first column of Table 2.4 with coefficients reported in the previous 
tables, we see that Britain, Korea and Switzerland the estimated parameters decrease in 
magnitude when the union dummy is included which suggests the effect is concentrated 
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among unionized workers in those three countries. The German estimate, in contrast, 
shows little change from including the unionization variable.  
Columns 2 and 3 separately report the estimate results of the relationship between 
individual unobservable abilities and involuntary job loss in the non-unionized and the 
unionized sectors. The British, Korean, and Swiss estimates all show that in the unionized 
sector lower ability workers are predicted to lose their jobs. The coefficients representing 
the relationship between unobserved ability and involuntary job loss for non-unionized 
workers are non-significant for those three countries. Only in Germany do both unionized 
and non-unionized workers face similar probabilities of job insecurity. Columns 4, 5, and 
6 contain similar patterns across the countries. 
To investigate why the German labor market responds differently in terms of the 
relationship between unobserved ability, unionization and involuntary job loss, I examine 
the distribution of the measures of unobserved skills across union and non-union workers 
in Figure 2.3.  What can be seen in the figure is that while unions in other countries either 
narrow the wage distribution (Britain) or shift the wage distribution upward (Korea and 
Switzerland), unions in Germany have little visible effect on the wage distribution. 
Germany has the heaviest penetration of unions across these countries and also more 
generally has a more strongly regulated labor market where multiple institutions influence 
both the unionized and non-unionized sectors.  These influences include mandated works 
councils, a legal right to unionize, high level collective bargaining, minimum wages, 
employment protection laws, etc. Lower ability workers in both the unionized and non-
unionized sectors gain positive economic rents from the employers and consequently 
would be displaced by the similar probabilities.  Stated differently, wage setting in unions 
in Germany has a pervasive effect on employers in the non-union sector in Germany and 
 86 
 
 
this drives similar labor market dynamics with employees regardless of whether they are 
unionized.   
[Insert Figure 2.3] 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
In this cross-national comparative study of Britain, Germany, Korea and Switzerland, I 
construct a measure of an individual worker’s unobservable job productivity and then use 
it to estimate its relationship to the probability that the worker will be displaced. I use both 
a pooled cross-section estimation strategy and an individual fixed-effect panel model to 
estimate unobservable productivity. Without exception lower ability workers in all of the 
countries experience a significantly higher probability of involuntary job loss and lower job 
security. I find that this result is consistent across different measures of unobservable 
ability and alternative specifications of the LPM models. Typically, when the individual 
fixed effect is used as the proxy measure of a worker’s time invariant ability, the 
relationship with involuntary job loss is larger than when the predicted wage residual from 
a pooled cross-sectional model is used, which suggests that constant attributes of the 
workers over time are a major determinant of job insecurity.  
Using the wage equation by pooled cross-section specifications, a worker’s 
unobservable ability is estimated by the wage residual. And the effect of the wage residual 
on the job displacement is greatest in Germany, as one standard deviation increase in the 
wage residual would decrease the worker’s probability of job loss by 3.45 percent. Such 
effect is the modest in Switzerland as the probability of job loss only decreases by 1.31 
percent. The effects of wage residual on the job loss in Britain and Korea are somewhere 
in between. The individual fixed effect is a stronger predictor of involuntary job loss and 
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provides a higher correlation between unobservable ability and involuntary job loss. One 
standard deviation increase in the individual fixed effect decreases the probability of job 
losing by 3.28 percent in Britain, 5.52 percent in Germany, 9.18 percent in Korea, and by 
2.87 percent in Switzerland. Such effect of individual fixed effect on job loss in the greatest 
in Korea and the modest in Switzerland. The findings here suggest that, who you are, in 
terms of the worker’s unobservable productivity, is the major determinant of the involuntary 
job loss. 
I also investigate the influences of unionization first by including a categorical 
variable for union status of the worker in the estimations and then separating the sample 
between union and non-union workers.  As a regressor, unionization significantly reduces 
the likelihood of involuntary job loss in all the countries examined except for Germany. 
However, when the data are separated based on union or non-union status, the correlation 
of observable ability and involuntary job loss is almost exclusively found in the unionized 
sectors while the estimates obtained for non-unionized sectors show no statistically 
significant effects. Germany is the only country in which unionization increases the 
probability of involuntary job loss, and both the unionized sector and non-unionized 
sectors offer similar systematic displacement probabilities for lower ability workers. In 
conclusion, the results regarding unionization suggest that where you work significantly 
influences involuntary job loss. The results based on the measures of unobserved 
productivity show that who you are also matters a great deal in influencing the odds of 
involuntary job loss.
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 Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
   Britain   Germany   Korea   Switzerland  
Variables Values Not Displaced Displaced Total Not Displaced Displaced Total Not Displace Displaced Total Not Displaced Displaced Total 
              
Gender Male 70.59 69.95 70.21 74.51 66.88 73.37 71.38 58.85 65.97 88.38 70.73 85.82 
 Female 29.41 30.05 29.79 25.49 33.13 26.63 28.62 41.15 34.03 11.62 29.27 14.18 
Age <30 5.15 17.62 12.46 5.36 13.13 6.52 12.79 17.70 14.91 4.15 4.88 4.26 
 30-39 31.25 25.13 27.66 38.73 35.00 38.18 48.82 36.28 43.40 26.56 41.46 28.72 
 40-49 58.82 28.24 40.88 45.51 40.00 44.69 29.63 40.71 34.42 43.98 43.90 43.97 
 >50 4.78 45.20 30.96 10.39 11.88 10.61 8.75 5.31 7.27 25.31 9.76 23.05 
Marriage Single 17.65 42.80 33.94 28.88 48.08 32.44 11.45 26.55 17.97 21.58 51.79 27.27 
 Married 82.35 57.20 66.06 71.12 51.92 67.56 88.55 73.45 82.03 78.42 48.21 72.73 
Education High School 70.49 73.42 72.14 74.56 86.23 76.20 43.69 78.46 56.53 57.27 58.54 57.46 
 College 20.49 20.25 20.36 13.14 7.97 12.41 51.35 20.00 39.77 25.99 29.27 26.49 
 Advanced 9.02 6.33 7.50 12.31 5.80 11.39 4.95 1.54 3.69 16.74 12.20 16.04 
Occupation Armed Forces 4.81 9.97 7.69 0.77 3.75 1.21 0.62 10.53 5.71 1.24 0.00 1.06 
 Managers 13.33 17.30 15.55 9.08 5.00 8.47 1.23 1.17 1.20 12.86 19.51 13.83 
 Professionals 10.37 11.44 10.97 16.30 6.25 14.80 7.41 4.09 5.71 20.75 19.51 20.57 
 Technicians 10.37 6.74 8.35 21.66 13.75 20.48 16.67 4.68 10.51 26.97 21.95 26.24 
 Clerical Support 16.30 11.73 13.75 9.52 13.75 10.15 36.42 16.96 26.43 6.64 14.63 7.80 
 Services and Sales 8.52 5.28 6.71 6.24 8.75 6.61 4.32 4.09 4.20 6.64 2.44 6.03 
 Agricultural 1.48 0.88 1.15 1.53 1.88 1.58 0.00 0.58 0.30 4.15 2.44 3.90 
 Craft 17.41 18.77 18.17 19.91 30.00 21.42 19.14 29.24 24.32 14.11 9.76 13.48 
 Machine Operators 13.33 13.49 13.42 10.50 8.75 10.24 10.49 21.05 15.92 2.49 7.32 3.19 
 Elementary Occupations 4.07 4.40 4.26 4.49 8.13 5.03 3.70 7.60 5.71 4.15 2.44 3.90 
Industry Agriculture 0.00 1.63 0.97 2.08 3.13 2.23 0.34 0.89 0.57 1.66 0.00 1.42 
 Energy 3.16 1.09 1.94 1.86 0.63 1.68 1.35 0.44 0.96 2.07 0.00 1.77 
 Mining 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.20 0.63 1.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 Manufacturing 26.88 40.87 35.16 23.63 25.62 23.93 22.90 43.56 31.80 17.84 21.95 18.44 
 Construction 7.11 5.45 6.13 15.65 21.25 16.48 6.06 12.00 8.62 4.56 2.44 4.26 
 Trade 9.49 12.81 11.45 10.07 15.00 10.80 3.70 11.56 7.09 7.88 21.95 9.93 
 Transport 11.46 5.45 7.90 5.14 6.88 5.40 9.09 4.44 7.09 9.96 9.76 9.93 
 Bank, Insurance 0.40 5.18 3.23 4.70 4.38 4.66 10.10 3.11 7.09 8.71 9.76 8.87 
 Services 36.36 18.26 25.65 34.46 18.75 32.12 46.46 19.11 34.67 32.78 24.39 31.56 
Annual Labor Earnings (In local currency) 21,926.79 19,752.31 21,048.12 39,333.94 27,487.25 38,088.26 3,463.649 1,816.315 3,136.548 113,209.8 91,508.9 111,092.2 
 Total Counts  267 442 709 914 207 1121 367 177 544 228 46 274 
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Table 2: Hedonic wage Estimation: Britain 
 
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5 6 
       
Female -0.244*** -0.241*** -0.225*** -0.242***   
 (0.0135) (0.0126) (0.0133) (0.0136)   
Age 0.0755*** 0.0615*** 0.0509*** 0.0530*** 0.0373*** 0.0373*** 
 (0.00513) (0.00488) (0.00452) (0.00450) (0.0112) (0.0112) 
Age squared -0.000842*** -0.000670*** -0.000574*** -0.000593*** -0.000542*** -0.000542*** 
 (6.09e-05) (5.75e-05) (5.31e-05) (5.29e-05) (6.60e-05) (6.60e-05) 
Married 0.111*** 0.107*** 0.0890*** 0.0781*** 0.00622 0.00622 
 (0.0163) (0.0149) (0.0138) (0.0136) (0.0144) (0.0144) 
Has child/children 0.0195 0.00535 -0.00229 -0.00296 -0.0190* -0.0190* 
 (0.0135) (0.0123) (0.0114) (0.0113) (0.0101) (0.0101) 
Has citizenship 0.101*** 0.104*** 0.0530** 0.0376   
 (0.0279) (0.0256) (0.0239) (0.0244)   
Tenure at current job  0.00841*** 0.00977*** 0.00710*** 0.0530*** 0.0530*** 
  (0.00253) (0.00232) (0.00232) (0.00992) (0.00992) 
High school degree  0.161*** 0.0984*** 0.0891*** 0.0666* 0.0666* 
  (0.0136) (0.0131) (0.0131) (0.0388) (0.0388) 
College degree  0.424*** 0.262*** 0.285*** 0.0624 0.0624 
  (0.0207) (0.0214) (0.0215) (0.0493) (0.0493) 
Graduate degree  0.701*** 0.507*** 0.484*** 0.113 0.113 
  (0.0300) (0.0308) (0.0300) (0.0913) (0.0913) 
Vocational degree  0.0612*** 0.0326*** 0.0253**   
  (0.0125) (0.0119) (0.0119)   
Constant 8.296*** 8.366*** 8.397*** 8.235*** 8.660*** 8.660*** 
 (0.110) (0.101) (0.113) (0.130) (0.322) (0.322) 
       
Observations 4,732 4,732 4,732 4,732 4,732 4,732 
R-squared 0.184 0.325 0.455 0.515 0.909 0.909 
Year YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Human Capital  YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry   YES YES  YES 
Occupation   YES YES  YES 
Industry-Occupation    YES  YES 
 Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3: Hedonic wage Estimation: Germany 
 
 VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5 6 
       
Female -0.209*** -0.211*** -0.230*** -0.231***   
 (0.0106) (0.00980) (0.00972) (0.00986)   
Age 0.0402*** 0.0159*** 0.0150*** 0.0173*** 0.0692*** 0.0647*** 
 (0.00579) (0.00557) (0.00503) (0.00507) (0.00453) (0.00461) 
Age squared -0.000364*** -0.000172** -0.000166*** -0.000193*** -0.000471*** -0.000438*** 
 (7.04e-05) (6.78e-05) (6.13e-05) (6.17e-05) (5.90e-05) (5.98e-05) 
Married 0.00634 0.000660 0.0154 0.0159* 0.0378*** 0.0385*** 
 (0.0115) (0.0106) (0.00956) (0.00962) (0.0110) (0.0111) 
Has child/children 0.0769*** 0.0551*** 0.0440*** 0.0463*** 0.00779 0.00433 
 (0.0109) (0.0101) (0.00906) (0.00914) (0.00778) (0.00785) 
Has citizenship 0.117*** 0.0474** -0.0576*** -0.0642*** 0.00121 0.00429 
 (0.0199) (0.0188) (0.0173) (0.0175) (0.0419) (0.0419) 
Tenure at current job  0.0347*** 0.0288*** 0.0279***   
  (0.00192) (0.00173) (0.00175)   
High school degree  0.108*** 0.0308* 0.0308* -0.0195 -0.0249 
  (0.0197) (0.0179) (0.0181) (0.0187) (0.0190) 
College degree  0.333*** 0.0620*** 0.0633*** -0.00876 -0.00580 
  (0.0202) (0.0197) (0.0200) (0.0271) (0.0274) 
Graduate degree  0.576*** 0.259*** 0.241*** 0.0347 0.0398 
  (0.0197) (0.0204) (0.0207) (0.0306) (0.0311) 
Vocational degree  -0.0335** -0.0227* -0.0257* -0.00388 0.00529 
  (0.0148) (0.0135) (0.0137) (0.0168) (0.0171) 
Constant 9.416*** 9.646*** 9.404*** 9.342*** 8.397*** 8.257*** 
 (0.116) (0.109) (0.104) (0.105) (0.103) (0.105) 
       
Observations 10,218 10,218 10,218 10,218 10,218 10,218 
R-squared 0.113 0.246 0.405 0.437 0.861 0.866 
Year YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Human Capital  YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry   YES YES  YES 
Occupation   YES YES  YES 
Industry-Occupation    YES  YES 
 Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4: Hedonic wage Estimation:  Korea 
 
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5 6 
       
Female -0.403*** -0.329*** -0.322*** -0.331***   
 (0.0161) (0.0132) (0.0137) (0.0137)   
Age -0.00198 0.00343 0.0172* 0.0144 -0.0146 -0.0192 
 (0.0103) (0.00966) (0.00942) (0.00937) (0.0648) (0.0645) 
Age squared 6.02e-05 -0.000185 -0.000322*** -0.000293** -0.00105*** -0.00111*** 
 (0.000130) (0.000125) (0.000122) (0.000122) (0.000154) (0.000159) 
Married 0.248*** 0.178*** 0.162*** 0.163*** 0.0691*** 0.0683*** 
 (0.0263) (0.0212) (0.0205) (0.0205) (0.0254) (0.0260) 
Has child/children 0.0318 0.0209 0.0293* 0.0244 0.00651 0.00291 
 (0.0212) (0.0170) (0.0162) (0.0160) (0.0147) (0.0149) 
Tenure at current job  0.0346*** 0.0318*** 0.0335*** 0.179*** 0.186*** 
  (0.00295) (0.00290) (0.00291) (0.0641) (0.0637) 
High school degree  0.169*** 0.0811*** 0.0665*** -0.00925 -0.00828 
  (0.0201) (0.0200) (0.0201) (0.0323) (0.0332) 
Vocational degree  0.300*** 0.184*** 0.151*** 0.00306 -0.00680 
  (0.0244) (0.0249) (0.0250) (0.0368) (0.0375) 
College degree  0.507*** 0.376*** 0.353*** 0.0532* 0.0322 
  (0.0201) (0.0213) (0.0214) (0.0310) (0.0318) 
Graduate degree  0.622*** 0.482*** 0.462*** 0.113*** 0.109*** 
  (0.0306) (0.0317) (0.0315) (0.0400) (0.0400) 
Constant 8.208*** 6.892*** 6.808*** 6.881*** 7.594*** 7.777*** 
 (0.193) (0.174) (0.195) (0.193) (1.703) (1.695) 
       
Observations 4,024 4,024 4,024 4,024 4,024 4,024 
R-squared 0.438 0.645 0.686 0.707 0.894 0.898 
Year YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Human Capital  YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry   YES YES  YES 
Occupation   YES YES  YES 
Industry-Occupation    YES  YES 
 Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5: Hedonic wage Estimation: Switzerland 
 
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5 6 
       
Female -0.0544* -0.125*** -0.198*** -0.189***   
 (0.0279) (0.0266) (0.0266) (0.0279)   
Age 0.0578*** 0.0469*** 0.0435*** 0.0494*** 0.0670*** 0.0669*** 
 (0.0102) (0.00932) (0.00890) (0.00931) (0.00969) (0.0104) 
Age squared -0.000518*** -0.000378*** -0.000382*** -0.000460*** -0.000523*** -0.000534*** 
 (0.000120) (0.000111) (0.000106) (0.000111) (0.000120) (0.000129) 
Married 0.119*** 0.119*** 0.0810*** 0.0523** -0.0407 -0.0267 
 (0.0250) (0.0220) (0.0212) (0.0222) (0.0289) (0.0311) 
Has child/children 0.0308 -0.00113 -0.00290 0.00670 0.0414** 0.0490** 
 (0.0209) (0.0184) (0.0172) (0.0181) (0.0193) (0.0205) 
Has citizenship 0.0799*** 0.0426 -0.0287 -0.00431 -0.0702 -0.0594 
 (0.0293) (0.0270) (0.0264) (0.0291) (0.0835) (0.0906) 
Tenure at current job  0.00587* 0.00584* 0.00558*   
  (0.00341) (0.00324) (0.00336)   
High school degree  0.295*** 0.174*** 0.0168 -0.125 -0.0802 
  (0.0478) (0.0522) (0.0588) (0.190) (0.212) 
College degree  0.454*** 0.269*** 0.0912 -0.255 -0.308 
  (0.0511) (0.0579) (0.0650) (0.201) (0.227) 
Graduate degree  0.648*** 0.397*** 0.257*** 0.230 0.217 
  (0.0391) (0.0405) (0.0451) (0.195) (0.213) 
Vocational degree  -0.217*** -0.155*** -0.0939** 0.276** 0.329** 
  (0.0352) (0.0416) (0.0459) (0.134) (0.165) 
Constant 9.869*** 9.904*** 10.27*** 10.31*** 9.560*** 9.699*** 
 (0.212) (0.191) (0.195) (0.235) (0.282) (0.329) 
       
Observations 2,521 2,521 2,521 2,521 2,521 2,521 
R-squared 0.099 0.313 0.451 0.502 0.817 0.826 
Year YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Human Capital  YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry   YES YES  YES 
Occupation   YES YES  YES 
Industry-Occupation    YES  YES 
 Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6: Probability of Involuntary Job Loss: Britain 
 
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5 6 
       
Wage Residual -0.0214*** -0.0194*** -0.0175*** -0.0164*** -2.19e-10 -2.19e-10 
 (0.00721) (0.00656) (0.00590) (0.00557) (0.00556) (0.00556) 
Individual Fixed Effect     -0.0328*** -0.0328*** 
     (0.00996) (0.00996) 
Female 0.0124 0.0122 0.0114 0.0123 -0.00296 -0.00296 
 (0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0166) (0.0166) 
Age -0.0985*** -0.0978*** -0.0972*** -0.0973*** -0.0963*** -0.0963*** 
 (0.00528) (0.00526) (0.00526) (0.00526) (0.00527) (0.00527) 
Married -0.112*** -0.112*** -0.111*** -0.111*** -0.106*** -0.106*** 
 (0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0160) (0.0160) 
Has child/children 0.0505*** 0.0513*** 0.0516*** 0.0517*** 0.0527*** 0.0527*** 
 (0.0133) (0.0133) (0.0133) (0.0133) (0.0133) (0.0133) 
Constant 2.713*** 2.709*** 2.708*** 2.714*** 2.687*** 2.687*** 
 (0.152) (0.152) (0.152) (0.152) (0.152) (0.152) 
       
Observations 4,732 4,732 4,732 4,732 4,732 4,732 
R-squared 0.421 0.421 0.421 0.421 0.422 0.422 
Year YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Human Capital YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Occupation YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry-Occupation YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7: Probability of Involuntary Job Loss: Germany 
 
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5 6 
       
Wage Residual -0.0432*** -0.0398*** -0.0354*** -0.0345*** 0.00191 6.44e-11 
 (0.00343) (0.00316) (0.00281) (0.00274) (0.00275) (0.00273) 
Individual Fixed Effect     -0.0576*** -0.0552*** 
     (0.00387) (0.00382) 
Female 0.0471*** 0.0472*** 0.0490*** 0.0492*** 0.0193** 0.0203*** 
 (0.00748) (0.00748) (0.00747) (0.00747) (0.00772) (0.00772) 
Age -0.0138*** -0.0115*** -0.0114*** -0.0117*** -0.0181*** -0.0176*** 
 (0.00385) (0.00384) (0.00384) (0.00384) (0.00385) (0.00385) 
Married -0.00379 -0.00325 -0.00466 -0.00471 -0.00732 -0.00752 
 (0.00729) (0.00729) (0.00729) (0.00729) (0.00727) (0.00727) 
Has child/children 0.0165** 0.0185*** 0.0196*** 0.0194*** 0.0243*** 0.0246*** 
 (0.00693) (0.00692) (0.00692) (0.00692) (0.00691) (0.00692) 
Constant 0.864*** 0.843*** 0.866*** 0.871*** 1.017*** 1.007*** 
 (0.0797) (0.0797) (0.0797) (0.0797) (0.0801) (0.0801) 
       
Observations 10,218 10,218 10,218 10,218 10,218 10,218 
R-squared 0.207 0.207 0.207 0.207 0.212 0.211 
Year YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Human Capital YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Occupation YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry-Occupation YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8: Probability of Involuntary Job Loss: Korea 
 
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5 6 
       
Wage Residual -0.0266*** -0.0212*** -0.0199*** -0.0192*** -0.000353 -2.50e-10 
 (0.00564) (0.00449) (0.00422) (0.00408) (0.00410) (0.00407) 
Individual Fixed Effect     -0.0895*** -0.0918*** 
     (0.0153) (0.0157) 
Female 0.123*** 0.119*** 0.118*** 0.119*** 0.0886*** 0.0892*** 
 (0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0118) (0.0117) 
Age 0.0870*** 0.0867*** 0.0859*** 0.0860*** 0.0886*** 0.0891*** 
 (0.00726) (0.00725) (0.00725) (0.00725) (0.00726) (0.00726) 
Married -0.132*** -0.128*** -0.127*** -0.128*** -0.119*** -0.119*** 
 (0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0159) 
Has child/children 0.0312** 0.0319** 0.0314** 0.0317** 0.0334*** 0.0336*** 
 (0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0124) 
Constant -1.285*** -1.261*** -1.256*** -1.260*** -1.323*** -1.340*** 
 (0.150) (0.149) (0.149) (0.149) (0.150) (0.150) 
       
Observations 4,024 4,024 4,024 4,024 4,024 4,024 
R-squared 0.593 0.593 0.593 0.593 0.595 0.595 
Year YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Human Capital YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Occupation YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry-Occupation YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 9: Probability of Involuntary Job Loss: Switzerland 
 
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5 6 
       
Wage Residual -0.0174*** -0.0151*** -0.0135*** -0.0131*** -0.00421 0 
 (0.00646) (0.00565) (0.00505) (0.00486) (0.00486) (0.00480) 
Individual Fixed Effect     -0.0200*** -0.0287*** 
     (0.00740) (0.00860) 
Female 0.0585*** 0.0613*** 0.0643*** 0.0639*** 0.0543*** 0.0522** 
 (0.0204) (0.0204) (0.0203) (0.0203) (0.0207) (0.0206) 
Age -0.00459 -0.00415 -0.00402 -0.00426 -0.00510 -0.00533 
 (0.00679) (0.00679) (0.00679) (0.00679) (0.00680) (0.00679) 
Married -0.0811*** -0.0811*** -0.0796*** -0.0784*** -0.0736*** -0.0735*** 
 (0.0162) (0.0162) (0.0162) (0.0162) (0.0163) (0.0162) 
Has child/children 0.0168 0.0181 0.0182 0.0178 0.0159 0.0152 
 (0.0132) (0.0132) (0.0132) (0.0132) (0.0132) (0.0132) 
Constant 0.970*** 0.968*** 0.954*** 0.952*** 0.983*** 0.990*** 
 (0.171) (0.171) (0.171) (0.171) (0.172) (0.172) 
       
Observations 2,521 2,521 2,521 2,521 2,521 2,521 
R-squared 0.377 0.377 0.377 0.377 0.378 0.378 
Year YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Human Capital YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Occupation YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry-Occupation YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 Standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 10: Probability of Involuntary Job Loss (Sensitivity): Britain 
 
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5 6 
       
Wage Residual -0.0163** -0.0164*** -0.0164*** -0.0164*** -1.67e-10 -2.19e-10 
 (0.00642) (0.00620) (0.00584) (0.00557) (0.00619) (0.00556) 
Individual Fixed Effect     -0.0122 -0.0328*** 
     (0.00912) (0.00996) 
Female 0.00530 -0.0216 0.0282* 0.0123 -0.0273* -0.00296 
 (0.0142) (0.0140) (0.0156) (0.0159) (0.0147) (0.0166) 
Age -0.122*** -0.0950*** -0.0932*** -0.0973*** -0.0944*** -0.0963*** 
 (0.00540) (0.00545) (0.00527) (0.00526) (0.00547) (0.00527) 
Married -0.0709*** -0.0661*** -0.0881*** -0.111*** -0.0638*** -0.106*** 
 (0.0172) (0.0166) (0.0161) (0.0159) (0.0167) (0.0160) 
Has child/children 0.00841 0.0153 0.0424*** 0.0517*** 0.0159 0.0527*** 
 (0.0142) (0.0138) (0.0133) (0.0133) (0.0138) (0.0133) 
Constant 2.386*** 2.166*** 2.684*** 2.714*** 2.159*** 2.687*** 
 (0.116) (0.113) (0.132) (0.152) (0.113) (0.152) 
       
Observations 4,732 4,732 4,732 4,732 4,732 4,732 
R-squared 0.213 0.267 0.353 0.421 0.266 0.422 
Year YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Human Capital  YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry   YES YES  YES 
Occupation   YES YES  YES 
Industry-Occupation    YES  YES 
 Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 11: Probability of Involuntary Job Loss (Sensitivity): Germany 
 
 VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5 6 
       
Wage Residual -0.0345*** -0.0345*** -0.0345*** -0.0345*** 9.73e-11 6.44e-11 
 (0.00292) (0.00285) (0.00280) (0.00274) (0.00282) (0.00273) 
Individual Fixed Effect     -0.0559*** -0.0552*** 
     (0.00332) (0.00382) 
Female 0.0401*** 0.0397*** 0.0527*** 0.0492*** 0.0144** 0.0203*** 
 (0.00687) (0.00673) (0.00738) (0.00747) (0.00686) (0.00772) 
Age -0.0348*** -0.0161*** -0.0129*** -0.0117*** -0.0222*** -0.0176*** 
 (0.00376) (0.00382) (0.00382) (0.00384) (0.00382) (0.00385) 
Married -0.0116 -0.00785 -0.00978 -0.00471 -0.0132* -0.00752 
 (0.00745) (0.00727) (0.00726) (0.00729) (0.00723) (0.00727) 
Has child/children 0.0142** 0.0172** 0.0170** 0.0194*** 0.0240*** 0.0246*** 
 (0.00709) (0.00693) (0.00687) (0.00692) (0.00690) (0.00692) 
Constant 0.792*** 0.646*** 0.857*** 0.871*** 0.787*** 1.007*** 
 (0.0756) (0.0751) (0.0791) (0.0797) (0.0750) (0.0801) 
       
Observations 10,218 10,218 10,218 10,218 10,218 10,218 
R-squared 0.079 0.127 0.159 0.207 0.139 0.211 
Year YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Human Capital  YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry   YES YES  YES 
Occupation   YES YES  YES 
Industry-Occupation    YES  YES 
 Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 12: Probability of Involuntary Job Loss (Sensitivity): Korea 
 
 VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5 6 
       
Wage Residual -0.0191*** -0.0192*** -0.0192*** -0.0192*** -2.19e-10 -2.50e-10 
 (0.00592) (0.00433) (0.00414) (0.00408) (0.00433) (0.00407) 
Individual Fixed Effect     -0.0496*** -0.0918*** 
     (0.0132) (0.0157) 
Female 0.125*** 0.0754*** 0.122*** 0.119*** 0.0599*** 0.0892*** 
 (0.0133) (0.00995) (0.0105) (0.0106) (0.0108) (0.0117) 
Age 0.0262*** 0.0860*** 0.0877*** 0.0860*** 0.0869*** 0.0891*** 
 (0.00851) (0.00729) (0.00719) (0.00725) (0.00730) (0.00726) 
Married -0.218*** -0.137*** -0.132*** -0.128*** -0.132*** -0.119*** 
 (0.0218) (0.0160) (0.0157) (0.0159) (0.0161) (0.0159) 
Has child/children 0.0228 0.0422*** 0.0361*** 0.0317** 0.0433*** 0.0336*** 
 (0.0175) (0.0129) (0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0129) (0.0124) 
Constant -0.266* -1.088*** -1.285*** -1.260*** -1.125*** -1.340*** 
 (0.158) (0.131) (0.149) (0.149) (0.131) (0.150) 
       
Observations 4,024 4,024 4,024 4,024 4,024 4,024 
R-squared 0.120 0.531 0.575 0.593 0.530 0.595 
Year YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Human Capital  YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry   YES YES  YES 
Occupation   YES YES  YES 
Industry-Occupation    YES  YES 
 Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 13: Probability of Involuntary Job Loss (Sensitivity): Switzerland  
 
 VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5 6 
       
Wage Residual -0.0131** -0.0131** -0.0131** -0.0131*** 0 0 
 (0.00579) (0.00568) (0.00543) (0.00486) (0.00562) (0.00480) 
Individual Fixed Effect     -0.0135** -0.0287*** 
     (0.00670) (0.00860) 
Female 0.0800*** 0.0974*** 0.102*** 0.0639*** 0.0932*** 0.0522** 
 (0.0185) (0.0198) (0.0210) (0.0203) (0.0199) (0.0206) 
Age -0.0109 0.00146 -0.000643 -0.00426 0.000740 -0.00533 
 (0.00676) (0.00693) (0.00702) (0.00679) (0.00694) (0.00679) 
Married -0.0529*** -0.0608*** -0.0583*** -0.0784*** -0.0562*** -0.0735*** 
 (0.0166) (0.0164) (0.0167) (0.0162) (0.0165) (0.0162) 
Has child/children 0.0125 0.0260* 0.00442 0.0178 0.0242* 0.0152 
 (0.0138) (0.0137) (0.0136) (0.0132) (0.0137) (0.0132) 
Constant 0.373*** 0.190 0.429*** 0.952*** 0.207 0.990*** 
 (0.141) (0.142) (0.154) (0.171) (0.142) (0.172) 
       
Observations 2,521 2,521 2,521 2,521 2,521 2,521 
R-squared 0.068 0.106 0.195 0.377 0.106 0.378 
Year YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Human Capital  YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry   YES YES  YES 
Occupation   YES YES  YES 
Industry-Occupation    YES  YES 
 Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 14: Probability of Involuntary Job Loss (Unionization) 
 
  Cross Section Fixed Effect 
Countries VARIABLES All Non-Union Union All Non-Union Union 
        
Britain Wage Residual -0.0155*** 0.00388 -0.0187*** -2.15e-10 -4.47e-10 0 
  (0.00559) (0.00814) (0.00694) (0.00556) (0.00813) (0.00690) 
 Individual Fixed Effect    -0.0311*** 0.00802 -0.0446*** 
     (0.0100) (0.0147) (0.0147) 
 Union -0.0264*   -0.0256*   
  (0.0144)   (0.0144)   
        
Germany Wage Residual -0.0343*** -0.0348*** -0.0316*** 6.58e-11 2.51e-10 -2.31e-10 
  (0.00274) (0.00314) (0.00485) (0.00273) (0.00313) (0.00483) 
 Individual Fixed Effect    -0.0549*** -0.0576*** -0.0589*** 
     (0.00382) (0.00452) (0.00771) 
 Union 0.0255***   0.0248***   
  (0.00706)   (0.00705)   
        
Korea Wage Residual -0.0100** -0.00526 -0.0179*** -2.27e-10 -6.04e-11 0 
  (0.00412) (0.00749) (0.00430) (0.00402) (0.00750) (0.00427) 
 Individual Fixed Effect    -0.0492*** -0.0355 -0.0848*** 
     (0.0161) (0.0396) (0.0159) 
 Union -0.115***   -0.111***   
  (0.0112)   (0.0113)   
        
Switzerland Wage Residual -0.0102** -0.00851 -0.0228*** 0 -5.40e-11 0 
  (0.00489) (0.00745) (0.00561) (0.00479) (0.00735) (0.00551) 
 Individual Fixed Effect    -0.0224** -0.0263 -0.0530*** 
     (0.00871) (0.0172) (0.0104) 
 Union -0.0543***   -0.0523***   
  (0.0126)   (0.0127)   
        
 Year YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 Human Capital YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 Industry YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 Occupation YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 Industry-Occupation YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 1: Wage residual using pooled cross section specification for all four countries with (a) Britain shown 
in the upper left figure, (b) Germany shown in the upper right one, (c) Korea shown in the lower left one and (d) 
Switzerland shown in the lower right one. The red solid lines show the distributions of the wage residuals for the 
displaced workers; blue dashed lines show the distributions of the wage residuals for the non-displaced workers.  
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Figure 2: Distributions of individual fixed effects from fixed effect specification for all four countries with (a) 
Britain shown in the upper left figure, (b) Germany shown in the upper right one, (c) Korea shown in the lower left one 
and (d) Switzerland shown in the lower right one. The red solid lines show the distributions of the individual fixed 
effects for the displaced workers; blue dashed lines show the distributions of the wage residuals for the non-displaced 
workers.  
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Figure 3: Distribution of wage residuals among unionized and non-unionized sectors in all four countries. 
Here the red solid lines show the distributions of unionized workers and the blue dashed lines show the distributions of 
non-unionized workers. 
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Chapter Three 
Family and Societal Responses to Job Displacement 
and Its Economic Effects on Individuals from a Cross-
National Perspective 
Kenneth A. Couch and Xiupeng Wang 
Abstract 
This paper considers the impact of involuntary job loss on workers in Germany and 
Great Britain making use of harmonized data drawn from the Cross National Equivalent 
File (CNEF) and underlying panel data for each country in the period from 1999-2008.  
Estimates are made of the impact of involuntary job displacement on the labor earnings 
of individual workers.  Then the role of spousal responses, through the added worker 
effect, are examined by looking at the impact of displacement on total household labor 
earnings.  The impact of involuntary job loss on pre-government family income is also 
examined in order to gauge the ability of families to use private resources to respond to 
the labor market shock of unexpected job loss.  Finally, the impact of involuntary job loss 
on post-government family income is also estimated to explore the role of societal 
responses to unexpected job loss for individuals.   
In Germany and Great Britain, losses of labor earnings are very similar four years 
after job loss, consistent with prior studies.  However, when the measures of economic 
resources are broadened to consider family labor earnings and asset income, families in 
Britain seem to be able to better respond to the losses of earnings caused by a job 
displacement. The cross-national contrast is even sharper when considering the additional 
role of government.  In Germany, no statistically significant differences in post-government 
income are observed following job displacement while four years later, losses in family 
income remain at more than 10 percent in Great Britain.
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3.1 Introduction 
The economic literature on job loss arising from reductions in demand has primarily 
focused on earnings effects for individual workers because of the theoretical interest in 
identifying the proportionate wage loss that arises from a break in employment with a 
specific firm (Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan 1993).  That literature has generally found 
that the break in employment on average is associated with permanent reductions in long-
term earnings of 7-15 percent across a range of data sources and model specifications 
(Couch and Placzek 2010).  Most studies of job displacement, even those outside the U.S. 
tend focus on individual countries (Couch 2001).  Additionally, relatively few studies 
examine broader responses in the family or society in response to job displacement 
(Couch 1998, Couch, Reznik, Tamborini and Iams 2018).  Here, we extend the existing 
literature by providing a comparative analysis of the impacts of job displacement on 
workers in thecountries of Germany and Great Britain while widening the analysis to 
examine impacts across countries on spousal labor supply, family pre-government 
income, and post-government income. 
In competitive economies, market innovations lead to the rise of employment in 
some firms and declines in others.  Those changes in employment in response to changes 
in demand for labor from firms may occur due to competitive pressures within or across 
countries.  Nonetheless, when employment declines in a firm due to slack demand that 
may extend to the point of business closure, the workers in the firm are argued to 
experience an exogenous shock (Fallick 1996, Kletzer 1998).  A sizeable literature has 
used this argument along with modern program evaluation methods to explore the impacts 
of job displacement on workers in individual countries like Germany (Burda and Mertens 
2001, Couch 2001, Schmieder, von Wachter, and Heining 2018) and Great Britain 
(Arulampalam 2001, Hijzen, Upward, and Wright.  2010).   
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One motivation for making the direct comparison between the two countries of 
Germany and Great Britain provided here is to gauge whether the costs of job loss on 
workers in terms of the proportion of wages lost when an employment relationship 
dissolves are similar across countries.  In the case of these particular countries, it is 
reasonable to believe the costs may differ in particular due to more extensive unionization 
in Germany (Abraham and Houseman 2010, Couch 2001) and associated requirements 
that layoffs have to be coordinated between unions, work councils, and industries and 
rationalized to reduce social costs.  Wang (2018) provides evidence that patterns of 
involuntary job loss are different in Germany than in Great Britain in part due to patterns 
of unionization and this may then also be reflected in patterns of wage loss. 
The countries examined are similar in some ways and differ in others.  Based on 
2017 World Bank data, the rate of labor force participation of women ages 15 and older in 
Germany and Great Britain respectively are 55 and 57 percent. 9  Rates of male labor 
force participation of men are 66 and 68 percent respectively.  The overall spreads in the 
rates of labor force participation among men and women are similar in the two countries.  
Thus, if a worker experiences job displacement in either country, it would appear that there 
are similar opportunities for other family members to respond by working more.  Here, we 
examine the potential impact of an involuntary job loss on the broader measure of family 
labor earnings to gauge how impacts vary depending on whether the individual or family 
are examined.  The response of the displaced person’s partner or spouse increasing their 
earnings as a response to a job displacement within the family may help buffer total family 
labor earnings from the loss due to involuntary job loss.  This is a potential form of self-
insurance within the family in response to job displacement. 
                                                          
9 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TLF.CACT.FE.ZS 
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Another potential buffer to job displacement is spending income from assets.  In a 
simple case, a worker who is displaced may elect to take a flow of income from an 
investment and this would be captured as part of family income.  So, we also examine the 
impact of job displacement on total family income as we seek to understand the impacts 
of involuntary job loss on broader measures of family well-being.   Again, the ability of 
families to buffer their own adverse experiences with private resources is a form of family 
self-insurance against an adverse event.  Thus, we examine the impact of job 
displacement on pre-government family income across the three countries. 
Finally, across countries there are different responses at a societal level to adverse 
life course events.  Germany has a more extensive safety net that protects the economic 
welfare of individuals and families than the relatively more market-oriented economy of 
Great Britain.  Examining how different countries buffer individuals and families from the 
economic costs associated with dynamic forces of a competitive economy that may result 
in involuntary job loss can help reveal the variation in how benefits of trade for some are 
used to offset losses to others.  For that purpose, we examine the impact of job loss on 
post-government income and compare it to losses in pre-government income to see how 
government transfers offset private losses. 
The only work we are aware of that has made a direct comparison of involuntarily 
displaced workers in Germany and Great Britain is Quintini and Venn (2013) which makes 
use of administrative data in the two countries and finds that the costs of job displacements 
on aggregate wages are similar in the two countries in the period examined.  The study 
finds that three years after an involuntary job loss, that earnings are about 10 percent 
lower among workers in Germany and the U.K. three years after displacement but the 
study uses administrative data from 1980-2004 in Germany and 2000-2010 in the United 
Kingdom.  The analysis conducted here using data from the British Household Panel 
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Study for the United Kingdom and the German Socio-Economic Panel for Germany allows 
us to first confirm the result of this prior research, that the impacts of involuntary job loss 
are similar for the worker themselves across the two countries.  However, the analysis 
provided here focuses on a range of different family and social responses in reaction to 
involuntary job loss.  Thus, this research provides a replication using a different data 
source while also examining additional outcomes. 
The paper proceeds by providing a larger description of the literature on the 
impacts of involuntary job loss on individual earnings and broader impacts on their families 
in Germany and Great Britain although that literature is less developed than for the U.S.  
We then describe the data used in the analysis and the estimation methods.  The empirical 
results are then presented followed by a discussion drawing conclusions of what is learned 
from these cross-national contrasts.  
 
3.2 Literature Review 
The literature on the effects of involuntary job loss in the United States is voluminous but 
much more limited for other countries.  Here, we focus on prior research conducted on 
Germany, the United Kingdom, and the one direct comparison we have found in the prior 
literature.   
The earliest work on involuntary job loss in Germany is found in Couch (2001).  
The paper provides extensive detail on the system of pattern bargaining by unions in 
Germany that extends over geographical locations and the role of work councils regarding 
local workplace issues and interaction with employers regarding planning for layoffs.  The 
paper also describes specific German laws that require employers to plan layoffs in co-
ordination with worker representatives.  The analysis (Couch 2001) makes use of data 
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from the German Socio-Economic Panel from 1988-1986 in the states of the former West 
Germany.  The paper concludes (p. 569) that, ““Earnings dropped the most during the 
year of displacement, with estimated losses of about 13.5% of pre-displacement earnings. 
Two years later, the earnings losses declined to about 6.5% of pre-displacement 
earnings.” 
Burda and Mertens (2001) also did early work on involuntary job displacement in 
Germany.  They similarly make use of SOEP data from 1985-1994 in their analysis.  
Although they examine a somewhat different time period than Couch (2001), they report 
(Table 4) that similarly report that for all displaced workers using SOEP data, wage losses 
are approximately 5 percent. 
More recently, Schmieder, von Wachter, and Heining (2018) examine involuntary 
job loss in Germany using administrative employment records from 1975-2007.  Their 
analysis focuses on men to concentrate on a sample with strong attachment to the labor 
market.    They find that the year of an involuntary job loss, earnings decline by about 30 
percent and that losses as large as 15 percent are still observed 15 years later. 
As previously mentioned, the cross-national OECD study authored by Quintini and 
Venn (2013) makes use of the same administrative data employed by Schmieder, von 
Wachter, and Heining (2018).  Focusing on earnings losses for a three-year period after 
an administrative job loss and using a similar comparison group methodology, they report 
earnings losses of about 10 percent three-years after involuntary job loss. 
In combination, these studies that have all focused on re-employed workers who 
previously experienced an involuntary job loss provide a range of estimates of earnings 
losses that range from about 5 to 15 percent.  This range of estimates appears similar to 
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those reported in a wide variety of U.S. studies based on different types of data during 
ordinary business cycle conditions (Couch and Placzek 2010).   
For Great Britain, the initial work of Arulampalam (2001) made use of the British 
Household Panel Study (BHPS) on a sample of men from 1991-1997 to examine the 
impact of job loss on hourly wage rates rather than earnings (wage rate multiplied by 
hours).  In samples that focus on the type of job loss, they find that those who experienced 
involuntary unemployment experienced hourly wage losses of 5 to 6 percent.   
The later work of Hijzen, Upward, and Wright (2010) made use of a 1 percent 
sample of workers matched to a panel of firms in the United Kingdom.  They match the 
New Earnings Survey, which is a 1 percent sample of all workers in the U.K. to the Inter-
Departmental Business Register, which is a list of firms in the U.K.  The linked data 
contains information on gross weekly pay and periodic employment in the firm from 1994-
2003.  They are able to look from four years before displacement to five years afterwards.  
They report (Hijzen et al. (2010), p. 269) that ““estimates suggest that the costs during the 
first five years after the displacement event are in the range 18-35 percent per year for 
workers whose firm closes down, and 14-25 percent for workers who exit a firm which 
suffers a mass layoff. If we exclude out-of-work income, these losses increase by 
approximately 4-5 percent per year.” 
Again, the OECD study authored by Quintini and Venn (2013) makes use of the 
same British administrative data as Hijzen, Upward, and Wright (2010) but for a different 
time period, from 2000-2010. They show (Figure 10) that monthly earnings losses the year 
of involuntary displacement are about 30 percent the year of job loss and recover to about 
a 10 percent loss after three years.   Comparable estimates from Hijzen, Upward, and 
Wright (2010) are 14-25 percent. 
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The estimates contained in the Quintini and Venn (2013) study which make use of 
administrative data in Germany and the United Kingdom report similar earnings losses 
across the countries three years after involuntary job displacement among re-employed 
workers of about 10 percent; however, the study makes use of data from different periods 
in the two countries and the prior literature shows that timing of estimates relative to the 
business cycle affects the magnitude of the estimated earnings losses (Couch and 
Placzek 2010; Couch, Jolly and Placzek 2011).    Comparing all estimates of earnings 
losses across the two countries regardless of data source, in Germany the estimated 
losses appear to range from about 5 to 15 percent and in Great Britain from about 10 to 
25 percent.  While the ranges of estimated earnings losses overlap substantially, one 
motivation for the current study is to draw data from comparable countries using symmetric 
data handling procedures and to directly estimate annual earnings losses associated with 
job displacement.  This has not been cleanly done in the prior literature. 
Then this analysis will further examine how total labor earnings change in response 
to an involuntary job loss.  When a worker loses their job, total family earnings do not 
decline by as large a magnitude so this outcome provides a different perspective on the 
extent of hardship imposed on the family.  Further, their partner may enter the labor market 
or increase work in order to offset earnings losses for the displaced worker.  Examining 
the circumstances of the involuntarily displaced worker in the context of their family helps 
better gauge the experiences of the worker and their family members.  This has generally 
not been well examined in the prior literature although examples can be found (Couch 
1998; Couch, Tamborini, Reznik and Iams 2018).   
Similarly, individuals and families may hold assets that can be converted into an 
income stream to buffer the family against losses of earnings. A basic motivation of 
savings is to provide resources in periods of unemployment whether planned or 
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unexpected.  So, the paper will also examine the impact of involuntary job loss on 
measures of total pre-government family income. 
Finally, different societies buffer the experiences of citizens against unexpected 
adverse events encountered in life.  Germany has a much more extensive social safety 
net than Great Britain and also greater worker involvement in rationalizing layoffs to 
minimize their consequences (Couch 2001).  Moreover, tax provisions to offset expenses 
associated with obtaining new employment due to relocation or training are also common.  
To examine the differential social responses across countries to involuntary job loss, we 
examine its impact on post-government measures of family income.  In the next section, 
we describe the data sources and construction of variables used in the study.  
  
3.3 Estimation Methodology 
In this paper, we make use of the panel fixed-effects estimation approach that has become 
common in the job displacement literature since the publication of Jacobson, LaLonde and 
Sullivan (1993) who first introduce program evaluation methods into the literature. The 
model can be written as:   
                      𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 + ∑ 𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑘𝛿𝑘𝑘≥−3 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡      .                                     [1] 
𝑌𝑖𝑡  is the dependent variable. We estimate this model on individual labor earnings, 
household labor earnings, and household pre- and post- government incomes. The 
parameter 𝛼𝑖  represents the individual fixed effect, which captures time-invariant 
heterogeneity among workers; 𝛾𝑡  here represents the year fixed-effects that absorb 
periodic variations in the macro economy. 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a matrix that consists of demographic 
characteristics of the individuals and firms where they work. 𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑘  are dummy variables 
represent the timing of the current period relative to the event of job displacement.  These 
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dummies have a superscripted index, k, which denotes the period relative to the time of 
involuntary job loss.  In the analysis, there are three years of data available prior to job 
loss, a year of job loss, and four years of follow-up data so k is indexed from -3 to 4.  The 
period k=0 is the year of job displacement.   𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑘 = 1 if the observation for the outcome 
variable aligns with this timing relative to the year of job displacement. So, the coefficients 
𝛿𝑘  capture the effects of displacement beginning before the job is lost (𝑘 < 0), during 
displacement (𝑘 = 0), following displacement (𝑘 > 0).  
 
3.4 Data Description 
This paper investigates the outcomes of the job displacement in two countries, Britain and 
Germany. We make use of data from the British Household Panel Study (BHPS)10 for 
Great Britain and from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) 11  for Germany, 
respectively.  The BHPS and SOEP are both longitudinal surveys that repeatedly interview 
the same group of households and their members every year. Some of the data from each 
of these surveys is incorporated in the form of harmonized variables provided by the 
Cross-National Equivalent File (CNEF)12 under unified standards (Burkhauser and Lillard 
2005; Frick et al. 2007).   While some variables used in the study are drawn directly from 
the CNEF supplemental data for both countries is also taken directly from both the BHPS 
and the SOEP data files to augment the analysis. 
The first wave of the BHPS was launched by the Institute for Social and Economic 
Research at Britain’s University of Essex in 1991 and has conducted annual interviews 
every subsequent year. 5,505 households and 10,264 individuals from 250 areas of Great 
                                                          
10 For more information about BHPS see: https://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/bhps. 
11 For more information about German SOEP see: https://www.diw.de/en/soep 
12 More information about CNEF can be found on the following website: https://cnef.ehe.osu.edu/ 
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Britain entered the first wave. Beginning in 1999, samples of 1,500 households in both 
Scotland and Wales were added to the main sample. The fieldwork typically starts during 
September of each wave year and runs through the following spring. The reference year 
regarding individual labor earnings is from September in the year prior to the interview 
until September in the year in which interviewing begins. 
The German Institute for Economic Research, Deutsches Institut für 
Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) Berlin, began fielding the SOEP in 1984. There are 12,245 
individuals from 5,921 households who were successfully interviewed by the fieldwork 
organization, TNS Infratest Sozialforschung, for the first wave. And since then, nearly 
11,000 households and about 30,000 persons have been sampled every year. The 
fieldwork typically starts at the end of January and lasts for nine months. The most recent 
available wave was surveyed in 2015 (Wave 32). The reference year is defined as the 
previous calendar year for each wave, which is different from the BHPS, due to the nature 
of the fieldwork strategy.  As the dating used in this study is relative to the timing of a job 
displacement, these differences in survey approach should not have a large impact on the 
analysis.  However, care was taken to be sure to correctly align the available survey 
measures relative to the year of an involuntary job loss. 
The CNEF is prepared by Dean Lillard and currently housed in the Department of 
Human Sciences at the Ohio State University.  The CNEF contains uniformly recoded (or 
harmonized) variables across the surveys it includes in order for the measures to be made 
consistent. The harmonization of the data is carried out in collaboration with the institutes 
that are responsible for the surveys contained in the CNEF.  
All four of the outcome variables in this paper are drawn from CNEF.  They are 
individual labor earnings, household labor income, household pre-government income, 
and household post-government income. The measures of labor earnings include all 
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payments received from employment during the reference year, including the pay from 
any current job that started before the end of the reference year and the pay from a 
previous job that ends after the beginning of the reference year. Household labor income 
sums the individual labor earnings across all household members, including wages and 
salary from all employment, and self-employment, plus income from bonuses, over-time, 
and profit sharing. Household pre-government income sums labor and nonlabor incomes 
of all household members before taxes and government transfers.  This measure includes 
annual gross labor income, household annual asset income, household private transfer 
income, household private retirement income. Household post-government income 
represents the combined household income after taxes, plus social security pensions and 
government transfers of the head, partner, and other family members.   
 
3.5 Sample construction 
This paper focus on prime aged workers who are between 25 and 55 years old. Displaced 
workers are those who lose their jobs for reasons such as firm closure, employer 
bankruptcy or mass layoff after at least three consecutive years of tenure with their 
employers before the job separation. As we want to observe effects three years prior to 
the displacement and up to four years afterwards, the treatment group only includes those 
workers who are displaced during 2002, 2003 and 2004, as our sample covers from 1999 
to 2008.   In the sample, observe workers who are employed from 1999-2001 who are 
then displaced in 2002.  Similarly, we observe workers continuously employed from 2000-
2002 and displaced in 2003 and those continuously employed from 2001-2003 who are 
displaced in 2004.  For all these groups we follow them for four years after their involuntary 
job displacement. 
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The control groups consist all workers who are with their employer through the 
entire ten-year period. Here, for both treatment and control groups, all jobs are full-time 
jobs. Part-time jobs and self-employment are not included in the samples. 
 
3.6 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3.1 reports the descriptive statistics for the samples in Great Britain and Germany. 
It includes the sample sizes of each conditional on job displacement, as well as by gender, 
age, marital status, and education levels.  
[Insert Table 3.1] 
In Britain, there are a total of 180 out of 843 workers who experience job 
displacement. Among them, 133 workers are males and 47 are females.  A relatively larger 
proportion of male workers (24.6%) in the British sample experiences job displacement 
than female workers (15.6%). The German SOEP data has a somewhat larger sample 
size, 2,161 observations combining both displaced and continuously employed workers. 
Among them, 241 of the workers are from displaced group. Similar to Britain, the majority 
of the displaced workers in Germany are male. However, the proportion of displaced 
workers among females with at least three years of continuous employment is 12.4%, 
somewhat larger than the proportion for males (10.7%).  
In terms of education level, the BHPS data shows that about 22.1% of workers 
with more than high school education and 22.5% of those with a high school education 
experience job displacement. The proportion of displaced workers is relatively lower 
among those with less than high school degree group in comparison to other education 
levels. 17.6% of workers with less than high school education experience job 
displacement. For the German SOEP sample, the proportions of displaced workers for 
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different education categories are 13.9% for less than a high school degree, 11.8% for 
those with high school degree, and 6.7% for those with more than a high school degree. 
For displaced workers in Britain and Germany, their annual labor earnings on 
average decrease after the job separation. In the year before the job separation, these 
workers in Britain make 21,665 pounds each year. But the year after the job separation, 
they make 18,827 pounds on average. German displaced workers make 31,046 euros in 
the year before the job separation and 28,318 euros the year after. On the other hand, for 
workers who keep their jobs during the period of study, their average labor earnings have 
been growing continuously with an average annual rate of 4.8% in Britain and a rate of 
3.6% in Germany. 
 
3.7 Empirical Results 
This section presents results based on estimations of (equation (1)) the panel fixed-effects 
model.  We first discuss the results for Britain with the four different dependent variables; 
the log of individual labor earnings, the log of household labor earnings, the log of 
household pre-government income, and the log of household post-government income. 
Afterwards, we provide a parallel discussion of the results for Germany for the same 
outcome variables.  
3.7.1 Individual labor earning losses in Britain 
The most direct outcome associated with job displacement is the loss of earnings 
from employment due to the separation. Table 3.2 presents the results from estimating 
equation (1) while the dependent variable is individual labor earnings. The independent 
variables included here are the dummy variables measuring the year of the particular 
observation relative to the year of job displacement. We present the estimated parameters 
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from 2 years before the displacement until 4 years after it, omitting 3 years before the 
displacement as the base year.  
The regression results presented in columns 1 through 4 use samples including 
workers of both genders. Column 1 is shows the results of the most parsimonious 
specification including year dummies along with the timing variables for job displacement. 
From columns 2 through column 4, we gradually add different groups of covariates. 
Column 2 adds the demographic characteristics including age, age-squared, gender, 
marital status, and presence of children.   Column 3 incorporates measures reflecting 
human capital which includes the educational categories of the individual, tenure with the 
current employer, and the square of the tenure.  Column 4 include measures of the 
workplace including the occupation and industry dummies.  The fifth and sixth columns of 
the table split the sample for males and females using the fully specified model from 
column 4.  The structure of the tables of regression results described here is maintained 
for all the other estimates of equation (1) presented in the paper. 
Column 1 in Table 3.2 shows that, in Britain, the estimates from the panel model 
do not reveal a statistically significant difference across the continuously working and 
displaced workers before the job displacement:  the estimator equalizes their earnings 
paths. During the year of job displacement, affected workers experience a statistically 
significant loss of labor earnings of 24 percent. Because the dependent variable here is 
the natural log of the individual labor earnings, we can interpret the coefficient of the 
dummy variable for the year of displacement as follows: compared to workers who keep 
their jobs, displaced workers lose 24% of their earnings.  The earnings losses the year of 
displacement would reflect partial years of earnings losses so the losses the first year after 
the job loss are somewhat larger (30 percent) and have recovered by four years later to 
24 percent.    
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As we add groups of covariates across columns 2 through 4 in Table 3.2, the 
estimated earnings losses are notably smaller in column 3 once human capital 
characteristics (education dummies, tenure and tenure squared) are added. Column 4 
shows the coefficients from the most fully specified regression which adds occupation and 
industry characteristics and the estimated earnings losses are similar to those in column 
3.   Due to the similarity of the estimates, we discuss those in column 4 here.  The year of 
the job loss, earnings are estimated to decline by 14 percent but in the first full year after 
job displacement the losses deepen to 21 percent.  By four years afterwards the earnings 
losses are estimated to be 13 percent.  
Column 5 and 6 in Table 3.2 estimate the earning losses for only male workers 
and female workers with the same regression model as column 4.  The comparison 
between these two columns shows that women have deeper earnings losses at the time 
of displacement and for the four follow-up years in our samples. The year after 
displacement men’s earnings losses are estimated to be 18 percent while women lose 31 
percent.  Four years after the job loss men have earnings 10 percent below the 
comparison group while women’s earnings are 16 percent lower.  
3.7.2 Household labor income losses in Britain 
Table 3.3 presents estimates using the log of household labor income as the 
dependent variable. Again, a pattern is seen across the columns that the estimated drops 
in total household labor income are smaller once human capital variables are included in 
the estimations.  Focusing the discussion on column 4 which reports the coefficients from 
the most saturated model including measures of demographic characteristics, human 
capital indicators, and job characteristics, the results show that the year when 
displacement occurs, household labor earnings drop by 14 percent.  This loss deepens to 
17 percent the year after job loss and remains 14 percent lower four years later.  The 
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overall impression is that on average losses in total family labor earnings are similar in 
proportion to those observed for individual labor earnings.  This suggests an added worker 
effect does not play an important role in explaining reactions to job displacement in this 
sample of workers in Britain as the larger value of labor earnings for the family falls by a 
roughly equal proportion to individual labor earnings.  The loss would have to be smaller 
for there to be any evidence of an added worker effect in the family to job loss. 
Column 5 and 6 in Table 3.3 present the results from the regressions for the 
families of male and female workers, respectively.  The year after the job displacement 
occurs, the earnings within families of male workers declines by 14 percent for men but 
26 percent for women.  Four years later, the respective drops in earnings are estimated 
to be 12 percent for men and 17 percent for women.  Conditional on gender, the estimated 
proportional losses in family earnings again appear to be similar to those in individual 
earnings suggesting there is not much self-insurance within the family in response to job 
loss through increased work in Britain. 
3.7.3 Household pre-government income losses in Britain 
 Table 3.4 presents the empirical results when the dependent variable in model (1) 
is the log of household pre-government income.  The reason for examining the total 
household pre-government income is that this offers the opportunity to capture the 
possibility of taking flows of income from assets in response to job loss.  What is interesting 
in Table 3.4 is that the magnitudes of the estimated earnings losses are very similar to 
those contained in Table 3.3.  Focusing on the fully saturated model in column 4 as an 
example, the year after job loss the proportionate drop in total family income is 17 percent 
and four years afterwards the losses are estimated to be 14 percent.  Comparable losses 
in individual and total family earnings one year after job loss are 21 and 17 percent.  Four 
years after job loss the estimated losses in individual and family earnings are 13 and 14 
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percent.  Thus, families do not appear to respond to job displacement on average by taking 
flows of income off of assets.  Comparisons of estimates from other columns of estimates 
in Table 3.4 to those in Tables 3.2 and 3.3 yield the same qualitative conclusion.  
3.7.4 Household post-government income losses in Britain 
 Table 3.5 contains estimates of equation (1) using post-government income as the 
dependent variable.  When earnings drop, tax liabilities fall but also workers who lose their 
jobs may qualify for public transfers or may elect to take social security pensions. Similarly, 
unemployment benefits, unemployment assistance, and unemployment subsistence 
allowances are included among the public transfers.  
 Focusing on the fully saturated model presented in column 4, the estimates appear 
to show that around the time of job displacement, proportionate losses in post-government 
family income are somewhat smaller than in pre-government income.  For example, the 
estimates drop in post-government income the year after job loss is 13 percent while it is 
17 percent for pre-government income.  Four years after job loss, the drop in post-
government income is 11 percent while for pre-government income it is 14 percent.  This 
moderation in the losses of income experienced by the families of displaced workers in 
the British data can be observed by making comparisons of the columns of estimates in 
Tables 5 and 4 in each model estimated. 
 To facilitate comparisons across the estimates with the different outcome 
variables, we plot them in Figure 3.1.  What can be seen in Figure 3.1 is that around the 
time of job displacement, drops in family earnings and total pre-government family income 
are somewhat smaller than for individual labor earnings.  However, those parameters 
would likely not be statistically different from each other.  But around the time of job 
displacement, government transfers and reductions in taxes somewhat buffer the drop in 
total household income.  However, four years after the job displacement, the drops in each 
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measure of economic well-being is similar.  As both pre-government and post-government 
income in Britain fall by proportions similar to those of individual earnings, this points to a 
general decline in the welfare of the family following job displacement. 
3.7.5 Individual labor earning losses in Germany 
Tables 6 through 9 contain comparable estimates of equation (1) for the German 
SOEP data.  The structure of the tables is the same as shown for the British estimates. 
 In the first four columns of Table 3.6 that use a combined sample of men and 
women workers, the parameter estimates for the decline in individual labor earnings in 
response to job displacement do not appear as sensitive to the set of control variables 
used.  The inclusion of human capital variables in columns 3 and 4 does not seem to 
meaningfully impact the estimates relative to when they are excluded in columns 1 and 2 
as was observed for Britain.  This suggests that measure human capital characteristics 
are more important in determining earnings in Britain. 
 As there is little difference in the estimates across the first four columns, we focus 
on the estimates in the model containing all covariates in column 4.  There we see that 
the drop in earnings the year of job displacement is 19 percent.  The year after this slightly 
widens to 21 percent.  Four years after job displacement the estimated drop in individual 
labor earnings is estimated to be 11 percent.  It is notable that the estimated earnings 
losses one year after and four years after displacement in Britain are very comparable, 21 
and 13 percent respectively. 
 Columns 5 and 6 again contain separate estimates for men and women 
respectively.  In Germany, the estimates earnings losses from job displacement tend to 
be somewhat larger for men than women.  For example, the year of job loss the estimated 
decline in earnings for men is 21 percent versus 14 percent for women.  Four years after 
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job displacement the estimated earnings losses for men are 13 percent for men and 14 
percent for women.  This gender pattern is the opposite of what is observed in Great 
Britain. 
3.7.6 Household labor income losses in Germany 
 Table 3.7 contains the estimates of total family reductions in labor earnings 
following job displacement. If other family members were responsive to losses of earnings 
of the worker who was displaced, potentially no losses in family earnings would be 
observed.  In general, across all the columns of estimates in the table, the decline in family 
labor earnings at the time of job loss is smaller proportionately than for individual labor 
earnings but no statistically significant reductions are observed four years after the job 
loss.   
 Considering the estimates contained in column 4 which contains all covariates and 
the combined sample of men and women, the total drop in family earnings the year of job 
displacement is 11 percent but four years later are a statistically insignificant 4 percent.  
In contrast to comparable estimates for Britain from Table 3.3 column 4, estimated losses 
there are a statistically significant 14 percent.  Family members in Germany appear to be 
more responsive to job displacement in working more than in Great Britain. 
3.7.7 Household pre-government income losses in Germany 
The estimates contained in Table 3.8 of equation (1) for pre-government 
household income look similar to those for total labor earnings.  Across all the columns of 
estimates, the losses are proportionately similar to those seen in Table 3.7.  For example, 
in the model containing all covariates in column 4, the drop in pre-government income the 
year after job loss is 12 percent and is a statistically insignificant 4 percent four years later, 
the same as in Table 3.7 after rounding.  The estimates in columns 5 and 6 for the samples 
of men and women separately show that three and four years after a job displacement, 
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pre-government family incomes among those who experienced a job loss are not 
statistically different from those that did not. 
3.7.8 Household post-government income losses in Germany 
Table 3.9 contains the estimates of model (1) considering post-tax and transfer 
family income as the dependent variable.   What can readily be seen across all the 
columns of the table is that after accounting for the activities of government, the family 
incomes of those who experience a job displacement are never statistically significant from 
those who did not beginning one-year after the job loss.  This shows that the response of 
the public sector in Germany is much more responsive to job displacement than in Great 
Britain. 
Again, we graph the estimated parameters for the four outcomes for Germany in 
Figure 3.2.  What can readily be seen in the figure is that following job displacement in 
Germany, individuals experience losses in labor earnings that are moderated when 
considering broader measures of family resources including other family labor earnings or 
additionally sources of asset income.  The most striking finding, however, is that the 
response of the public sector appears to effectively offset the reductions in economic 
resources caused by job displacement.  
 
3.8 Discussion and Conclusion 
Making use of comparable panel data from the BHPS for Great Britain and the SOEP for 
Germany, we estimate panel fixed-effects models examining the responsiveness of 
annual individual earnings, annual family earnings, family pre-government income, and 
family post-government income.  Estimates of family resource measures before and after 
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the activities of government are used to contrast individual experiences with those 
experienced within a family and the broader society. 
 With respect to individual earnings, on average, the experiences of workers 
following job displacement do not appear that different across countries.  Four-years after 
job displacement, earnings losses in Germany are 11 percent and 13 percent in Great 
Britain.  However, as measures of broader resources are considered, such as family labor 
earnings, the experiences of workers in the two countries appear to be quite different.  For 
example, as the resource measure is widened to consider total family labor earnings, four 
years after displacement in Germany there are no statistically significant differences 
between those that experienced a job loss and those who did not while in Great Britain, 
comparable estimates show a 14 percent loss in earnings.   
 This same pattern, of more social protection from the adverse consequences of 
job loss in Germany within a family relative to Great Britain is also seen when considering 
pre-government family income.  Four years after a family member experiences job 
displacement, no significant differences are found in pre-government family incomes for 
those that experience a job loss and a comparison group that remains continuously 
employed on average.  However, in the British data, estimates of losses of 14 percent are 
still observed four years after the job loss. 
 The most striking pattern across countries is observed when considering the role 
of the public sector in buffering individuals and their families from the adverse 
consequences of job displacement.  Four years after job displacement, workers in the 
BHPS data are found to experience losses of resources amounting to 11 percent in 
comparison to continuously employed workers in the sample.  In contrast, in Germany, no 
statistically significant differences in post-government incomes are found between 
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workers who experienced job displacement and those that did not beginning the first year 
after the job loss throughout the remainder of the sample period. 
 The contrast between a relatively more market-oriented economy such as Great 
Britain and one that provides more protections for workers and their families against 
adverse events such as Germany is useful in highlighting differential responses in the 
marketplace, the family and society to job loss brought on by unexpected events largely 
seen as independent of choices made by individual workers.  The response of individual 
earnings as a result of job displacement is similar across the two countries, confirming the 
results of prior research (Quintini and Venn 2013).  It is also clear that across the two 
countries, that families in Germany appear to be more responsive to adverse economic 
events and do more to offset them. 
 The sharpest contrast across Germany and Great Britain found in this study is the 
striking difference in the response of government to job displacement.  Once the system 
of taxes and transfers in each country is reflected in the measures of family resources 
considered, no difference is found between the economic resources available to families 
where a worker lost a job and families where this did not occur.
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
  Britain Germany 
Variables Values Not Displaced Displaced Total Not Displaced Displaced Total 
Gender Male 408 133 541 1,434 172 1,606 
 Female 255 47 302 486 69 555 
Age 25-34 74 36 110 185 55 240 
 35-44 226 58 284 738 95 833 
 45-55 289 61 350 879 67 946 
Marriage Status Married 572 155 727 1,500 166 1,666 
 Not Married 91 25 116 420 75 495 
Education Less than High School 122 26 148 149 24 173 
 High School 38 11 49 1,350 181 1,531 
 More than High School 503 143 646 655 47 702 
Total Counts  663 180 843 1,920 241 2,161 
Note: The numbers reported here are the numbers of individuals for both displaced workers and continuously working 
people. Ages reported here are the average ages of across all observations for each individual.  
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Table 2: Individual Labor Earning Losses in Britain 
 
Variable All All All All Male Female 
2 years before -0.043 -0.044 -0.047 -0.050 -0.020 -0.136 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)* (0.024)* (0.026) (0.051)** 
1 year before -0.029 -0.031 -0.015 -0.015 0.016 -0.106 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.026) (0.051)* 
Displacement -0.238 -0.239 -0.145 -0.143 -0.142 -0.128 
 (0.024)*** (0.024)*** (0.027)*** (0.028)*** (0.031)*** (0.058)* 
1 year after -0.301 -0.303 -0.212 -0.211 -0.175 -0.311 
 (0.025)*** (0.025)*** (0.028)*** (0.028)*** (0.031)*** (0.059)*** 
2 years after -0.254 -0.257 -0.161 -0.159 -0.111 -0.272 
 (0.025)*** (0.025)*** (0.028)*** (0.029)*** (0.032)*** (0.059)*** 
3 years after -0.226 -0.229 -0.128 -0.123 -0.101 -0.137 
 (0.025)*** (0.025)*** (0.029)*** (0.029)*** (0.032)** (0.063)* 
4 years after -0.235 -0.239 -0.135 -0.130 -0.104 -0.155 
 (0.026)*** (0.026)*** (0.030)*** (0.030)*** (0.034)** (0.064)* 
Constant 10.072 9.591 9.420 9.494 9.410 9.818 
 (0.009)*** (0.466)*** (0.465)*** (0.466)*** (0.569)*** (0.801)*** 
R2 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 
N 7,280 7,280 7,280 7,280 4,655 2,625 
Demographic  Y Y Y Y Y 
Human   Y Y Y Y 
Job    Y Y Y 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Household Labor Income Losses in Britain 
 
Variable All All All All Male Female 
2 years before -0.042 -0.045 -0.047 -0.050 0.001 -0.225 
 (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.033) (0.066)** 
1 year before -0.036 -0.049 -0.039 -0.039 -0.014 -0.116 
 (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.033) (0.065) 
Displacement -0.193 -0.204 -0.147 -0.141 -0.153 -0.102 
 (0.032)*** (0.031)*** (0.035)*** (0.035)*** (0.038)** (0.075) 
1 year after -0.217 -0.231 -0.173 -0.169 -0.138 -0.259 
 (0.033)*** (0.031)*** (0.035)*** (0.035)*** (0.039)** (0.075)** 
2 years after -0.210 -0.224 -0.160 -0.153 -0.096 -0.304 
 (0.033)*** (0.031)*** (0.036)*** (0.036)*** (0.040)* (0.076)** 
3 years after -0.185 -0.191 -0.121 -0.114 -0.104 -0.140 
 (0.033)*** (0.032)*** (0.037)*** (0.037)** (0.041)* (0.081) 
4 years after -0.208 -0.219 -0.144 -0.137 -0.122 -0.165 
 (0.034)*** (0.032)*** (0.038)*** (0.038)*** (0.042)** (0.083)* 
Constant 10.577 8.982 8.830 8.895 9.196 8.414 
 (0.011)*** (0.587)*** (0.588)*** (0.591)*** (0.714)** (1.032)** 
R2 0.79 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.81 0.80 
N 7,280 7,280 7,280 7,280 4,655 2,625 
Demographic  Y Y Y Y Y 
Human   Y Y Y Y 
Job    Y Y Y 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
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Table 4: Household Pre-Government Income in Britain 
 
Variable All All All All Male Female 
2 years before -0.046 -0.049 -0.051 -0.054 -0.007 -0.224 
 (0.033) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.074)** 
1 year before -0.036 -0.049 -0.042 -0.041 -0.018 -0.117 
 (0.033) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.034) (0.073) 
Displacement -0.180 -0.191 -0.151 -0.146 -0.157 -0.111 
 (0.033)*** (0.032)*** (0.037)*** (0.037)*** (0.039)** (0.084) 
1 year after -0.199 -0.214 -0.173 -0.169 -0.139 -0.266 
 (0.034)*** (0.033)*** (0.037)*** (0.037)*** (0.040)** (0.085)** 
2 years after -0.181 -0.195 -0.150 -0.142 -0.078 -0.317 
 (0.034)*** (0.033)*** (0.038)*** (0.038)*** (0.041) (0.086)** 
3 years after -0.170 -0.176 -0.128 -0.122 -0.101 -0.180 
 (0.035)*** (0.034)*** (0.039)** (0.039)** (0.041)* (0.090)* 
4 years after -0.186 -0.197 -0.146 -0.140 -0.115 -0.194 
 (0.035)*** (0.034)*** (0.040)*** (0.040)*** (0.043)** (0.093)* 
Constant 10.613 9.297 9.201 9.235 9.756 8.364 
 (0.012)*** (0.620)*** (0.621)*** (0.624)*** (0.721)** (1.157)** 
R2 0.78 0.79 0.79 0.80 0.82 0.77 
N 7,280 7,280 7,280 7,280 4,655 2,625 
Demographic  Y Y Y Y Y 
Human   Y Y Y Y 
Job    Y Y Y 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Household Post-Government Income in Britain 
 
Variable All All All All Male Female 
2 years before -0.061 -0.058 -0.058 -0.055 -0.030 -0.145 
 (0.027)* (0.026)* (0.026)* (0.026)* (0.030) (0.055)** 
1 year before -0.031 -0.035 -0.030 -0.025 -0.007 -0.078 
 (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.030) (0.055) 
Displacement -0.156 -0.159 -0.129 -0.129 -0.126 -0.140 
 (0.028)*** (0.026)*** (0.031)*** (0.031)*** (0.035)** (0.065)* 
1 year after -0.161 -0.164 -0.132 -0.133 -0.115 -0.192 
 (0.028)*** (0.027)*** (0.031)*** (0.031)*** (0.035)** (0.065)** 
2 years after -0.117 -0.120 -0.082 -0.083 -0.046 -0.184 
 (0.028)*** (0.027)*** (0.032)** (0.032)** (0.037) (0.066)** 
3 years after -0.144 -0.129 -0.087 -0.088 -0.068 -0.153 
 (0.032)*** (0.031)*** (0.035)* (0.035)* (0.040) (0.078)* 
4 years after -0.174 -0.162 -0.116 -0.113 -0.093 -0.158 
 (0.043)*** (0.042)*** (0.046)* (0.046)* (0.053) (0.093) 
Constant 10.322 9.624 9.540 9.543 10.146 8.638 
 (0.010)*** (0.545)*** (0.545)*** (0.549)*** (0.680)** (0.936)** 
R2 0.81 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.84 
N 5,245 5,245 5,245 5,245 3,416 1,829 
Demographic  Y Y Y Y Y 
Human   Y Y Y Y 
Job    Y Y Y 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
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Table 6: Individual Labor Earning Losses in Germany 
 
Variable All All All All Male Female 
2 years before -0.001 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 0.005 -0.031 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.023) (0.036) 
1 year before -0.027 -0.032 -0.034 -0.032 -0.033 -0.037 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.023) (0.036) 
Displacement -0.183 -0.190 -0.190 -0.192 -0.211 -0.144 
 (0.020)*** (0.020)*** (0.022)*** (0.022)*** (0.026)*** (0.039)*** 
1 year after -0.204 -0.215 -0.217 -0.208 -0.240 -0.133 
 (0.022)*** (0.022)*** (0.023)*** (0.023)*** (0.028)*** (0.043)** 
2 years after -0.183 -0.196 -0.199 -0.192 -0.193 -0.199 
 (0.021)*** (0.021)*** (0.022)*** (0.022)*** (0.027)*** (0.041)*** 
3 years after -0.140 -0.155 -0.159 -0.154 -0.159 -0.157 
 (0.021)*** (0.021)*** (0.023)*** (0.023)*** (0.027)*** (0.041)*** 
4 years after -0.089 -0.106 -0.113 -0.106 -0.127 -0.065 
 (0.022)*** (0.022)*** (0.023)*** (0.023)*** (0.028)*** (0.042) 
Constant 10.633 11.463 11.379 11.345 11.371 11.236 
 (0.005)*** (0.097)*** (0.119)*** (0.119)*** (0.142)*** (0.223)*** 
R2 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.89 
N 17,098 17,098 17,098 17,098 12,870 4,228 
Demographic  Y Y Y Y Y 
Human   Y Y Y Y 
Job    Y Y Y 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Household Labor Income Losses in Germany 
 
Variable All All All All Male Female 
2 years before 0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 0.015 -0.063 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.027) (0.051) 
1 year before -0.011 -0.022 -0.022 -0.021 -0.024 -0.021 
 (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.026) (0.050) 
Displacement -0.090 -0.104 -0.107 -0.110 -0.131 -0.056 
 (0.024)*** (0.024)*** (0.026)*** (0.026)*** (0.029)** (0.055) 
1 year after -0.097 -0.117 -0.120 -0.116 -0.131 -0.073 
 (0.026)*** (0.026)*** (0.028)*** (0.028)*** (0.032)** (0.060) 
2 years after -0.085 -0.106 -0.109 -0.106 -0.108 -0.112 
 (0.025)*** (0.025)*** (0.027)*** (0.027)*** (0.030)** (0.058) 
3 years after -0.047 -0.071 -0.075 -0.073 -0.075 -0.081 
 (0.026) (0.026)** (0.027)** (0.027)** (0.031)* (0.059) 
4 years after -0.011 -0.039 -0.043 -0.040 -0.058 -0.013 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.028) (0.028) (0.031) (0.059) 
Constant 10.986 11.916 12.022 12.007 11.610 12.997 
 (0.005)*** (0.116)*** (0.142)*** (0.143)*** (0.161)** (0.315)** 
R2 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.85 0.85 
N 17,098 17,098 17,098 17,098 12,870 4,228 
Demographic  Y Y Y Y Y 
Human   Y Y Y Y 
Job    Y Y Y 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
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Table 8: Household Pre-Government Income in Germany 
 
Variable All All All All Male Female 
2 years before 0.008 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.018 -0.057 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.027) (0.051) 
1 year before -0.016 -0.025 -0.026 -0.025 -0.024 -0.038 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.027) (0.050) 
Displacement -0.089 -0.103 -0.102 -0.105 -0.122 -0.067 
 (0.024)*** (0.024)*** (0.026)*** (0.026)*** (0.030)** (0.055) 
1 year after -0.101 -0.120 -0.120 -0.117 -0.121 -0.104 
 (0.026)*** (0.026)*** (0.028)*** (0.028)*** (0.032)** (0.060) 
2 years after -0.081 -0.101 -0.101 -0.099 -0.096 -0.118 
 (0.025)** (0.025)*** (0.027)*** (0.027)*** (0.030)** (0.058)* 
3 years after -0.049 -0.072 -0.072 -0.071 -0.070 -0.090 
 (0.026) (0.026)** (0.027)** (0.027)** (0.031)* (0.059) 
4 years after -0.014 -0.041 -0.041 -0.038 -0.054 -0.021 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.028) (0.028) (0.032) (0.059) 
Constant 11.020 11.883 11.969 11.959 11.551 13.008 
 (0.005)*** (0.117)*** (0.143)*** (0.144)*** (0.162)** (0.315)** 
R2 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 
N 17,098 17,098 17,098 17,098 12,870 4,228 
Demographic  Y Y Y Y Y 
Human   Y Y Y Y 
Job    Y Y Y 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
 
 
 
 
Table 9: Household Post-Government Income in Germany 
 
Variable All All All All Male Female 
2 years before 0.017 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.022 -0.027 
 (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.023) (0.043) 
1 year before -0.012 -0.018 -0.019 -0.018 -0.017 -0.030 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.023) (0.043) 
Displacement 0.051 0.042 0.045 0.043 0.038 0.047 
 (0.021)* (0.021)* (0.022)* (0.022) (0.026) (0.047) 
1 year after 0.000 -0.014 -0.012 -0.014 0.000 -0.056 
 (0.023) (0.022) (0.024) (0.024) (0.028) (0.051) 
2 years after -0.007 -0.021 -0.019 -0.021 -0.002 -0.080 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.026) (0.049) 
3 years after 0.002 -0.014 -0.013 -0.014 -0.006 -0.047 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.027) (0.050) 
4 years after 0.022 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.006 -0.020 
 (0.023) (0.022) (0.024) (0.024) (0.027) (0.050) 
Constant 10.696 11.116 11.148 11.165 10.874 11.910 
 (0.005)*** (0.100)*** (0.123)*** (0.124)*** (0.140)** (0.268)** 
R2 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.86 0.85 0.86 
N 17,098 17,098 17,098 17,098 12,870 4,228 
Demographic  Y Y Y Y Y 
Human   Y Y Y Y 
Job    Y Y Y 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
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Figure 1: Outcomes of Job Displacement in Britain 
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Figure 2: Outcomes of Job Displacement in Germany 
 
 
